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Summary
This report is one of a series of outputs from the independent evaluation of a programme 
of projects demonstrating the direct payment of Housing Benefit to social renting tenants in 
Great Britain. It highlights the key findings of a study into underpayment (that is, the partial 
payment of rent), which emerged as being a major issue in the first year of the programme.
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Executive summary
Context 
This report, which was written in February 2014, is one of a series of outputs from the 
independent evaluation of the Direct Payment Demonstration Projects (DPDPs). It is 
concerned with the underpayment of rent, which emerged as being an issue in the first 12 
months of the DPDP programme, which went ‘live’ in early summer 2012. It draws on three 
main research exercises:
• analysis of the rent accounts of all tenants who received direct payments.
• a telephone survey of tenants who had switched back under one of the two 
underpayment trigger periods for the English and Welsh Demonstration Projects1: trigger 
periods 3 and 4. The survey was conducted in November 2013 by Ipsos MORI, who were 
supplied with the contact details of the 1,110 tenants identified by landlords as having 
switched back under trigger periods 3 and 4. In order to maximise the response rate, 
tenants were contacted on numerous occasions (and at different times of the day) and 
were invited by letter to take part in the survey. In all, 95 interviews were conducted. It is 
important to note that there is a relatively large statistical margin of error associated with a 
sample of 95 so its results should be seen as being indicative not authoritative;
• in-depth interviews with 20 tenants who had underpaid their rent while on direct payment.
The use of multiple research methods allows data to be corroborated and 
triangulated. And taken together, the data collected by three research exercises 
provides a valuable and robust insight into underpayment in the DPDPs.
Findings
Rent payment patterns in the Direct Payment
Demonstration Project: an overview
• It was more common for tenants to underpay their rent (pay some but not all of the rent 
due) than it was for tenants to pay no rent (fail to pay all the rent due).
• Just over three-quarters of all tenants on direct payment underpaid their rent at least once. 
Of the remaining tenants, some paid fully every period and some failed to pay all the rent 
owed at least once, but never underpaid.
• Amongst those who failed to pay some or all the rent owed during their time on direct 
payment, more than half accrued these arrears through underpayment only, compared 
with 12 per cent who accrued their arrears through non-payment only.
1 The Scottish case study did not employ these triggers and therefore the survey did not 
include any tenants from it.
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Patterns of underpayment
Patterns of underpayment were explored by analysing the rent accounts of the 5,031 
tenants who received at least seven direct payments of Housing Benefit (HB). Those tenants 
receiving fewer than seven direct payments were excluded from this analysis because 
patterns were more difficult to discern amongst tenants with limited experience of direct 
payment. 
• There were four main types of underpayment: one-off underpayment; frequent erratic 
underpayment (i.e. where underpayments were made frequently2 but not usually 
consecutively); frequent persistent underpayment (i.e. where underpayments were made 
often and consecutively); and infrequent underpayment.
• Many tenants who underpaid did so frequently. Nearly half of all underpayers could be 
classed as frequent underpayers in the sense that they underpaid more than three or four 
times (depending on how long they had been in receipt of direct payment).
• However, most underpayment was also erratic in the sense that tenants’ payment 
behaviour one month was not a good predictor of their payment behaviour going forward. 
Payment behaviour fluctuated, with tenants underpaying by different amounts and moving 
between underpayment, non-payment and full payment over time. 
• No underpayment group was associated with a particular amount of underpayment. In 
each underpayment group there were tenants who underpaid by a small amount and those 
who underpaid by a large amount. The amount by which an individual tenant underpaid 
also tended to vary period on period. 
• Nineteen per cent of all tenants who received seven or more direct payments of HB could 
be classed as frequent persistent underpayers in the sense that they made regular and 
consecutive underpayment. However, the amount by which tenants underpaid varied 
period on period. 
• Underpayers and non-payers were not distinct groups. Non-payment was a feature of 
underpayers payment patterns. In total, 25 per cent of tenants underpaid in at least one 
period and failed to pay any rent in at least one period.
The impact of underpayment
• Non-payers were far fewer in number than underpayers, but they accounted for nearly 
half the total value of arrears accrued in the first 12 months of the DPDP. Nevertheless, 
because of the relatively high number of tenants underpaying, underpayment did account 
for more than 50 per cent of arrears.
• Low-value underpayment (less than 15 per cent of rent owed underpaid) had a limited 
impact on the value of arrears, despite low value underpayers being the largest 
underpayment group in terms of numbers of tenants. 
• Frequent underpayers made a greater contribution to the overall value of arrears than 
infrequent or one-off underpayers. Nearly half of the total value of arrears was accrued by 
persistent underpayers.
2 ‘Frequent’ was defined as at least three underpayments for tenants who received 7 to 9 
direct payments of HB, and at least four underpayments for tenants who received ten 
or more direct payments. A pattern was deemed ‘erratic’ if no more than two of these 
underpayments were consecutive.
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• Arrears arising from underpayment compounded tenants’ debt problems – 44 per cent 
had existing debts – and put some tenants in arrears whose rent accounts had previously 
balanced. 
• Tenants also reported an emotional impact of underpaying, frequently expressing feelings 
of guilt, shame and embarrassment. 
Understanding underpayment
Analysis of data garnered from a telephone survey and in depth interviews with one key 
underpayer sub-group – tenants who switched back under the underpayment switchback 
trigger periods, 3 and 4 – and rent account analysis, provides an insight into how and why 
underpayment occurred and who underpaid. It appears that a bundle of factors contributed 
to underpayment. These included:
• The characteristics and circumstances of tenants. Rent Account Analysis (RAA) 
revealed that (compared to non-payers and full payers) underpayers were more likely 
to be younger in terms of their age profile and to be in work. Conversely, they were less 
likely to pay their rent by Direct Debit and be on full HB. In terms of the characteristics of 
the four underpayer types, in most respects, they differed very little. However, frequent 
underpayers, whether erratic or persistent, were much less likely than their counterparts 
to pay their rent by DD.
• The challenging nature and complexity of tenants’ lives. Many participants in the 
telephone survey and in-depth interviewees led complex and precarious lives which made 
them susceptible (and exposed) to life ‘events’, such as family illness or the breakdown 
of a relationship. More than half – 51 per cent – of the 95 telephone survey participants 
reported that they had a disability and more than three-quarters reported that they were 
not working. And many in-depth interviewees had health problems. For example, Colin3, 
was bipolar; Ricky suffered from the illness COPD4; Angie suffered from depression and 
had panic attacks; Harry was a recovering alcoholic; while Pauline was agoraphobic. 
• Tenants’ financial circumstances. Perhaps not unexpectedly, many trigger 3 and 4 
‘underpayers’ were struggling to ‘get by’ financially, with this appearing to be the biggest 
contributory factor behind their underpayment. 
• Poor money management. Many trigger 3 and 4 underpayers reported that they had 
poor money management skills, with more than half (54 per cent) disagreeing with the 
statement: ‘I am never late at paying my bills’. And only 15 per cent had ‘never run out of 
money at the end of the week or month in the last 12 months’.
• Tenants’ attitudes to spending and saving. Nearly a third of telephone survey 
respondents agreed with the statements: ‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even 
when I can’t really afford them’ and ‘I am more of a spender than a saver’. 
• The prioritisation of other bills over rent. A significant proportion – 44 per cent – of 
respondents to the telephone survey reported that they did not prioritise the payment of 
their rent. 
3 In order to protect their identity, in-depth interviewees have been given pseudonyms.
4 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
15
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Rent underpayment
• Confusion about direct payment, HB monies and rent. For some tenants, 
underpayment occurred because they did not appear to understand how direct payment, 
HB and/or their rent ‘worked’.
• Problems with the administration of HB and bank accounts, which appeared to be an 
issue for a number of in-depth interviewees. 
• Difficulties adjusting to direct payment. The inability of some tenants to adjust to direct 
payment appears to have contributed to underpayment. Four of the 43 respondents who 
gave a reason for their underpayment cited ‘I was still getting/could not get used to paying 
the rent myself’, while two cited: ‘I will still getting/could not get used to managing my HB 
money.’ 
• Lack of support. Another factor which appears to have contributed to telephone survey 
participants underpaying is a lack of support to help them manage on direct payment: 
relatively few – eight per cent (or eight tenants) – had received any.
• The ‘temptation’ to spend HB. A sizeable proportion of tenants in the telephone survey 
and in-depth interviewees were concerned that they would be tempted to ‘misspend’ their 
HB. Some did. However, in practice, most of those tenants who did so reported that they 
used their HB to pay for necessities and financial emergencies, and not frivolously, on 
‘luxuries’. 
• A strategic and intentional attempt to be removed from the DPDP programme? 
When the DPDP programme was conceived there was concern that some tenants would 
underpay (or not pay) their rent as part of a conscious and deliberate strategy to be taken 
off direct payment and/or to secure, what one Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
stakeholder described, as an ‘interest free loan’. We found no evidence to support the 
latter assertion but some to support the former: for a small number of tenants (i.e. the five 
out of 43 telephone survey respondents who gave a reason for their underpayment), it 
appears that their desire to leave the DPDP programme was a contributory factor behind 
their underpayment, with their underpayment (in part) being strategic and intentional. 
• Accidental underpayment: 15 of out of the 43 telephone survey respondents who 
were asked the question about why they underpaid reported that they had done so by 
‘mistake’. In terms of intent, it appears that underpayers can be categorised into the three 
groups: strategic, intentional underpayers; accidental underpayers; and trigger prompted 
underpayers, whose underpayment, while intentional, was caused by an immediate trigger, 
such as a bill to be paid, or a life event, such as illness, bereavement or a relationship 
breakdown.
• ‘Triggers’: Although there were a number of underlying factors which appeared to 
contribute to underpayment, it was often triggered by a specific trigger(s). These fell into 
two categories: day-to-day triggers, such as the need to pay an outstanding gas or electric 
bill or ‘running’ out of food; and life events, such as breaking-up with a partner, family 
illness or bereavement.
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Key learning 
• Underpayment was an issue in the DPDP programme. More than three-quarters of all 
tenants underpaid (i.e. paid some but not all of their rent) while on direct payment, with 
underpayment accounting for more than half of the total value of arrears that accrued in 
the first 12 months of the programme.
• With the roll out of Universal Credit (UC) in mind, it is an issue that DWP, landlords and 
other stakeholders should pay particular attention to. However, it is not an issue that 
is easily ‘solved’. This is because, in a number of respects, it is a messy and complex 
problem.
 – First, it is complex in terms of the patterns of underpayment, with underpayers falling 
into four groups: one-off underpayers; frequent, erratic underpayers (i.e. whose 
underpayments are made often but not usually consecutively); frequent, persistent 
underpayers (i.e. whose underpayments are made often and consecutively); and 
infrequent underpayers.
 – Second, underpayment is difficult to predict. This is because most underpayment 
is ‘erratic’ in the sense that tenants’ payment behaviour one month was not a good 
predictor of their payment behaviour going forward. Payment behaviour fluctuated, 
with tenants underpaying by different amounts and moving between underpayment 
non-payment and full payment over time. And there was very much a sense that many 
tenants started anew with each payment period, with it being a new challenge and event. 
 – Third, it is complex in terms of how tenants come to underpay with there being a bundle 
of interlinked factors that appear to be behind it. Notwithstanding this, the most important 
contributory factor appears to be the financial circumstances of tenants, many of whom 
reported that they were finding it very difficult to ‘get by’. 
 – Fourth, underpayment was often triggered by a particular life event, such as breaking-up 
with a partner, family illness or bereavement. Predicting such events is impossible. Many 
of the underpayers that comprised the telephone survey and in-depth interviewees led 
complex and precarious lives which made them more susceptible (and exposed) to such 
events. 
• One of the rationales behind the decision to undertake bespoke research on 
underpayment was the notion that persistent underpayment was an issue in the DPDP 
programme. It was – just under one-quarter of underpayers (19 per cent of all tenants 
who received seven or more direct payments of HB) could be classed as persistent 
underpayers in the sense that they made regular and consecutive underpayment. 
• Although not a panacea for the problem of underpayment, it appears that providing more 
support to tenants, particularly at the start of direct payment, may have a positive impact 
on payment patterns. 
• It appears that are no ‘winners’ in terms of underpayment. It had an adverse impact on 
landlords arrears. But it also adversely affected tenants, many of whom were finding it 
difficult to pay back the rent they owed and were embarrassed and ashamed about the 
situation they found themselves in. And there was little evidence to suggest that tenants 
had ‘beaten’ the system. However, it appears that a small number had underpaid their 
rent as part of a strategic, intentional attempt to revert to landlord payment: five of the 43 
telephone respondents who gave a reason for their underpayment cited ‘I wanted to be 
taken off the DP trial’.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This report, which was written in February 2014, is one of a series of outputs from the 
independent evaluation of the Direct Payment Demonstration Projects (DPDPs). The six 
DPDPs, which were concerned with pioneering the direct payment of Housing Benefit (HB) 
to social renting tenants, were: Edinburgh; Oxford; Shropshire; Southwark; Torfaen; and 
Wakefield. The first direct payments of HB were made in the English and Welsh Project 
Areas in June 2012 and in the Scottish Project Area in August 2012. 
The evaluation is being undertaken by a research consortium from the Centre for Regional 
Economic and Social Research (CRESR) at Sheffield Hallam University, the Institute of 
Social Policy at the University of Oxford, and Ipsos MORI (IM). The primary purpose of the 
evaluation is to learn lessons, providing feedback into demonstration project implementation 
and Universal Credit (UC) design.5 
This report focuses on the issue of ‘underpayment’ of rent. In the first year of the DPDP, 
underpayment (as opposed to non-payment) emerged as being more widespread and more 
prevalent than had been envisaged when the programme was conceived. The research 
consortium were therefore asked to undertake some bespoke research into the issue. 
The report presents the key findings to emerge from this exercise, which comprised three 
principal elements: a survey of tenants who had underpaid; in depth interviews with 20 of 
these tenants; and analysis of the rent accounts of tenants on direct payment. 
1.2 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects 
Programme
On 14 September 2011, Lord Freud, the Minister for Welfare Reform, announced that six 
DPDPs would be created to ‘test some key elements of social sector housing support under 
Universal Credit while protecting social landlords’ financial position’. This would involve two 
significant changes for (the up to 2,000) working-age6 claimants in each of the participating 
projects:
• receiving HB payments once every four weeks7 (broadly in-line with monthly payments 
under UC) as opposed to weekly or fortnightly; and
• paying rent to tenants themselves.
Social housing landlords were invited to take part in the programme, which was originally 
planned to run for a year, and DWP received over 70 expressions of interests from local 
authorities and registered housing providers. From these, DWP received 23 applications. 
5 For further information about the DPDP programme, see: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/
asd/asd5/rports2013-2014/rrep839.pdf
6 In addition to non-working-age tenants, it should also be noted that tenants in 
temporary and supported accommodation on a short-term basis are were also exempt 
from the programme.
7 In the Edinburgh project, HB was paid to tenants monthly.
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A range of criteria was used to select projects, including geography: the sample selected 
(ideally) had to include partnerships from London, the North of England, the South of 
England, Scotland and Wales. It also had to (ideally) include at least one Large Scale 
Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) housing association. Five successful partnerships in England 
and Wales were announced on 19 January 2012 and a sixth – in Scotland – joined the 
programme in May 2012. The six DPDPs were:
• Oxford – Oxford City Council and Oxford Citizens Housing Association (OCHA), trading as 
part of the GreenSquare Housing Group, Southern England;
• Shropshire – Shropshire Council, Bromford Group, Sanctuary Housing and The Wrekin 
Housing Trust, West Midlands;
• Southwark – London Borough of Southwark and Family Mosaic, London;
• Torfaen – Torfaen Borough Council, Bron Afon Community Housing and Charter Housing, 
South-east Wales;
• Wakefield – Wakefield Council and Wakefield and District Housing, Northern England;
• Edinburgh – City of Edinburgh Council and Dunedin Canmore Housing Association, Scotland.
The overall aim of the DPDPs was to highlight key lessons and learning points in terms of 
the direct payment of HB to feed into UC design ahead of its introduction from October 2013. 
More specifically, the projects were concerned with: exploring the effects of direct payment 
on landlords and tenants; examining the effectiveness of the different types of support 
provided to tenants to help them prepare for and manage direct payment; and testing direct 
payment safeguard mechanisms for landlords.
This was achieved by a support assessment process and, varying across the projects, the 
length of time (or switchback trigger period) for a return to landlord payment after tenants 
had fallen into arrears. Three of the projects had an eight-week (or equivalent) trigger 
period – Oxford, Torfaen and Wakefield – Edinburgh had a one-month trigger period, while 
Southwark and Shropshire had four-week and 12-week triggers respectively. In terms of the 
criteria to be used for determining when tenants were to be switched-back and how arrears 
was to be measured and defined, there was a programme-wide agreement that it would 
happen when:
• ‘Trigger 1 – the tenant’s rent arrears arising during the Demonstration Project period equal 
the amount of (a month/4/8/12 weeks’) rent for that tenant;
• Trigger 2 – the tenant has not paid any Rent for (a month/4/8/12 weeks) during the 
Demonstration Project Period;
• Trigger 3 – the tenant has underpaid her/his rent by 15 per cent or more in each of the 
periods of 4 weeks in the preceding 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration Project 
period;
• Trigger 4 – the tenant has underpaid her/his rent by 15 per cent or more in the preceding 
period of 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration Project period.’8
In practice, more than two-thirds of the 1,031 ‘switchbacks’ that had occurred by March 2013 
had been under triggers 3 and 4. Reflecting this, DWP asked the research consortium to 
undertake bespoke research into this group when it decided to extend the DPDP programme 
and evaluation in May 2013. As noted earlier, this report presents the findings of this exercise. 
8 Written submission provided by a DWP Relationship Manager.
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Working alongside the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the English, Welsh and 
Scottish projects began work preparing for direct payment in their areas in January 2012, 
with work beginning in Edinburgh in May 2012. The English and Welsh projects went ‘live’ 
in June and July of 2012 when the first phase of tenants were moved onto direct payment, 
with Edinburgh following suit in August 2012. Reflecting differences in the preparedness of 
tenants to move onto direct payment, it was decided to adopt a phased approach to moving 
tenants onto the programme, with those in the first phase assessed as being most prepared 
to go onto it. Although the number of phases varied by Project Area, all had undertaken their 
last one by the beginning of 2013. In all, by May 2013 7,426 of tenants had gone onto direct 
payment.9 As table 1.1 reveals, ‘in-scope’ numbers were fairly similar in five of the areas 
(Edinburgh, Shropshire, Southwark, Torfaen, and Wakefield) at around 1,000 tenants, with 
there being one ‘outlier’, Oxford, which put more than 1,700 tenants onto direct payment. 
Table 1.1 Number of tenants transferred onto direct payment








Source: DWP monitoring information, March 2013.10 
1.3 Evaluation objectives and overall approach to 
the research
The main aim of the research programme is to monitor and evaluate the preparation, delivery 
and effectiveness of the DPDPs, learning lessons about effective implementation to feed 
into relevant aspects of UC design and future housing policy and strategy. The evaluation is 
monitoring the effect of direct payment on tenants, landlords and other stakeholders such as 
support agencies, lenders, and local authorities.11 
In exploring these issues the evaluation is employing a mixed-methods approach which 
comprises the following activities: tenant surveys; in-depth qualitative interviews with tenants 
and stakeholders; and an analysis of participating landlord rent accounts and management 
costs, a process which is referred to as ‘Rent Account Analysis’ (RAA). RAA is taking 
place at two points in time (12 months and 18 months) so as to assess the impact of direct 
payment over time.
9 See DWP Press Release of 16 May 2013, Direct Payment projects extended by 6 
months, which is available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/direct-payment-
projects-extended-for-6-months
10 This figure has been used as DWP’s May 2013 press release does not present in-scope 
numbers at the area level.
11 These objectives did not change with the extension of the evaluation. However, the 
study team have also been asked to explore if (and how) recent welfare reforms, such 
as the Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS), have impacted on DPDP.
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1.4 Approach to the research on underpayment
Although this report makes some reference to insights gathered from the wider evaluation, 
it is primarily concerned with presenting the findings of the bespoke research into 
underpayment, which comprised three principal elements12: 
• a telephone survey of tenants who had switched back under one of the two 
underpayment triggers in England and Wales13: triggers 3 and 4;
• in-depth interviews with 20 tenants who had underpaid their rent while on 
direct payment; and 
• analysis of the rent accounts of all tenants who received direct payment.
1.4.1 Telephone survey
The survey was conducted in November 2013 by Ipsos MORI, who were supplied with the 
contact details of the 1,110 tenants identified by landlords as having switched back under 
triggers 3 and 4. In order to maximise the response rate, all tenants were contacted on 
numerous occasions (and at different times of the day) and were invited by letter to take part 
in the survey. In all, 95 interviews14 were conducted. 
When the survey was conceived it was anticipated that more interviews would be achieved. 
The lower than anticipated response rate appears to be a result of a number of factors: 
• the reluctance of tenants to talk about their experience of being on direct payment – as will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter 5, many were ‘embarrassed’ and ‘ashamed’ that they 
had got into difficulties;
• inaccurate contact information for tenants in part caused by the relatively large numbers 
who appear to change mobile phone numbers on a regular basis; and,
• an apparent reluctance for some tenants to engage with ‘outsiders’, including the 
evaluation team.
The survey provides a valuable and detailed insight into the perceptions, attitudes, 
experiences of underpayers. However, it is important to note that there are some ‘health 
warnings’ associated with its findings:
• first, there is a relatively large statistical margin of error associated with a sample of 95 so 
its results should be seen as being indicative not authoritative; 
• second, some of the participants in the survey may have been non-payers and not 
underpayers, as non-payers could also be switched back under Trigger 4 (instead of the 
main triggers of 1 and 2). Qualitative work undertaken by the study team revealed that 
some landlords had indeed adopted this practice;
12 The report also makes some reference to an additional data source: interviews with 
members of the tenants panels that ran in each of the six demonstration projects over 
the course of the evaluation.
13 The Scottish case study did not employ these triggers and therefore the survey did not 
include any tenants from it.
14 Because of the difficulties encountered generating an interview sample, a non 
purposive approach was taken to sampling, with no quotas being applied.
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• third, notwithstanding this point, it is also important to note that the underpayers 
surveyed represented only a small sub-set of the broader underpayer population – 
i.e. those switched back under triggers 3 and 4. As is noted in subsequent chapters, 
the underpayment population was relatively large and included many other types of 
underpayers;
• fourth, despite the careful wording of the questionnaire and detailed briefing by IM, there 
appeared to be some (understandable) confusion amongst participants in the survey 
about precisely what underpayment was. This resulted in a lower than expected number 
of respondents reporting that they underpaid in relation to one of the questions exploring 
the issue. However, the inclusion of multiple questions on the subject allowed the study 
team to establish the scale of underpayment within the sample, with the majority of tenants 
having underpaid (in the broadest sense) their rent. Thus, analysis is primarily focused on 
the sample as a whole, i.e. the 95 tenants who participated in the survey.
1.4.2 In-depth interviews with underpayers 
In-depth interviews were conducted face-to-face with tenants who had underpaid between 
December 2013 and January 2014. For interviews conducted in English and Welsh Project 
Areas, the sample was derived from the telephone survey. For the Scottish area, the 
sample was derived by the evaluation team from the rent account data provided by Dunedin 
Canmore. Dunedin Canmore had employed neither of the underpayment triggers (triggers 
3 and 4) and so, in contrast to respondents interviewed in the English and Welsh Project 
Areas, respondents interviewed in Scotland had not necessarily switched back although all 
had failed to pay some of their rent while on direct payment.15
1.4.3 Rent account analysis
This was (primarily) concerned with identifying: the scale of underpayment; types of 
underpayment; the characteristics of tenants who underpaid; and the value of underpayment. 
The mechanics of how the study team undertook rent account analysis is outlined in full 
in Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key findings of the 12 months’ Rent Account 
Analysis exercise, DWP Research Report No. 879. This analysis was not restricted to 
tenants who had switched back under triggers 3 or 4, but included all tenants who had failed 
to pay some, but not all of their rent in at least one period while on direct payment across all 
six Project Areas.
The use of multiple research methods allows data to be triangulated16 and 
corroborated. And taken together, the data collected by three research exercises 
provides a valuable and robust insight into underpayment in the DPDPs.
15 In order to protect their identity, interviewees have been given pseudonyms.
16 Triangulation involves comparing data on a subject in order to validate (or not) 
the findings of individual data sources, thereby providing more robust (and 
nuanced) analysis.
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1.5 Status and structure of this report
It is important to note that the study team are producing a number of written outputs. Two of 
these have already been published: the ‘Baseline’ Report17, which highlighted the findings 
to emerge from the baseline survey of tenants undertaken prior to the DPDP programme 
commencing; and the ‘Six Months In Extended Learning Report’18, which highlighted the key 
learning to emerge from the first six months of the DPDP programme being live. The study 
team is publishing eight more outputs, which are described in Chapter 6. This report should 
therefore be read alongside all these outputs.
The report is divided into six chapters, including this one. Drawing on rent account data, 
Chapter 2 examines payment patterns in the DPDP programme, and while doing so 
highlighting the scale of underpayment. Chapter 3 uses rent account and telephone survey 
data to explore patterns of underpayment and generate a typology for it, while the same 
data sources are used in Chapter 4 to explore the impact of underpayment on landlords and 
tenants. Chapter 5 explores how and why underpayment arises, in doing so, shedding light 
on who underpays. It does so with particular reference to data garnered from the telephone 
survey and underpayer in-depth interviews. It identifies a bundle of factors that appear to 
contribute to underpayment. The final chapter is primarily concerned with highlighting the key 
learning to emerge from the study, particularly with the roll out of UC in mind. The Appendix 
presents additional analysis from the telephone survey. 
17 Kemp, P., Hickman, P., Reeve, K., Collins, B., Finlay, S. and Robinson, D. (2012). 
Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: Findings from a baseline survey of tenants in five 
Project Areas in England and Wales. DWP Research Report No. 822. London: Department 
for Work and Pensions. A copy of the report can be downloaded at: https://www.gov.uk/
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193327/rrep822.pdf
18 Hickman, P. and Reeve, K. (2013). Direct Payments Demonstration Projects: Learning 
the lessons, six months in. DWP Research Report No. 839. London: Department for 
Work and Pensions.. A copy of the report can be downloaded at: http://www.shu.ac.uk/
research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/direct-payments-learning-lessons.pdf
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2 Rent payment patterns in the 
Direct Payment Demonstration 
Project: an overview
2.1 Introduction
In the first 12 months of the Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) participating 
tenants paid 94.3 per cent of the rent owed.19 Arrears therefore represented 5.7 per cent of 
rent owed20, amounting to £1.6m.21
Whether overall arrears accrued because a few tenants paid no rent or because lots of 
tenants failed to pay some rent is a key question for landlords. There are implications for 
collection and recovery costs: the higher the number of non-/underpayers (regardless of 
the amount they owe) the more actions are required to recoup that debt. In addition, the 
drivers of non-payment are likely to be very different to the drivers of, for example, low value 
underpayment and this will influence the interventions and support landlords develop going 
forward into Universal Credit (UC). This chapter explores the prevalence of underpayment.
2.2 Prevalence of underpayment
Analysis of the payment patterns of all those direct payment tenants who failed to pay some 
or all of their rent – and whose arrears comprised £1.6m outstanding at the end of the first 
12 months – reveals that underpayment of rent was more common that non-payment. 
Tenants paying no rent formed a relatively small proportion of all those who accrued arrears 
– between 27 per cent in the second ‘rent payment period’22 and a low of 13 per cent in in 
the 11th rent payment period (see Figure 2.1). In total, 76 per cent of tenants underpaid (paid 
some but not all of their rent) while on direct payment.
19 Some tenants went onto direct payment in June 2012, some in July 2012, some in 
August 2012 and so on. For the purposes of this analysis tenants were only included 
once they started to receive direct payment and not before. The number of rent 
payments due during the first year of DPDP therefore varied depending on when a 
tenant was first put onto direct payment.
20 ‘In this report the term ‘rent’ or ‘rent owed’ is used to refer to the debit put on a tenants 
rent account and in some cases will include charges other than rent such as service 
charges.
21 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key findings of the 12 months’ Rent Account 
Analysis exercise, DWP Research Report No. 879.
22 Rent payment periods are a construct devised by the study team to facilitate analysis. A 
rent payment period is a four week period, or a month in the case of Edinburgh, over 
which landlords would expect tenant rent accounts to balance.
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of underpayers by amount of underpayment
Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of underpayment in each payment period, with the blue 
section of each column representing the tenants who paid no rent, and the red, green and 
purple section of each column representing different categories of underpayment (50 to 
99.9 per cent; 15 to 50 per cent and 0.1 to 15 per cent respectively). In every rent payment 
period, non-payers were far fewer in number than underpayers and, with the exception of 
payment period 1, non-payers were fewer in number than low value underpayers (i.e. those 
who underpaid by 15 per cent or less of their rent).23
2.3 Summary
• Underpayment of rent was more common than non-payment of rent.
• Just over three-quarters of all tenants underpaid their rent at least once while on direct 
payment.
• Amongst those tenants who failed to pay all the rent owed during their time on direct 
payment, more than half accrued these arrears through underpayment only, compared 
with 12 per cent who accrued their arrears through non-payment only.
23 See Chapter 4 for discussion of the value of underpayment and non-payment respectively.
Period
Base: All underpayers and non-payers in rent payment period (637–4,045).
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3  Patterns of underpayment
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has shown that underpayment of rent was more common amongst 
Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) tenants than non-payment of rent (although 
see Chapter 4 for discussion of the relative impact of non-payment and underpayment on the 
total value of arrears). However, the distinction between ‘underpayers’ and ‘non-payers’ (and, 
indeed, ‘full payers’) is not absolute. Some tenants underpay in one period, pay fully for a 
while and then fail to pay any rent. Overpayment is also a feature of some tenants’ payment 
history. 
Analysis of the rent accounts of the 5,031 tenants who received seven or more direct 
payments of Housing Benefit (HB)24 revealed that:
• 10 per cent paid all their rent (always paid, never underpaying or failing to pay);
• 55 per cent underpaid their rent in at least one period but never failed to pay all their rent 
(only underpaid);
• 11 per cent failed to pay any rent in at least one period but never underpaid (only not paid);
• 25 per cent underpaid in at least one period and failed to pay all their rent in at least one 
period (underpaid and not-paid).
The remainder of this report examines the second and last of these groups in more detail 
– the relatively large cohort of tenants who received seven or more direct payment of HB 
and who underpaid their rent in at least one period – in an effort to understand patterns 
of underpayment, the reasons for underpayment, and the characteristics associated with 
underpayment. In the remainder of this report the term ‘underpayer’ is used to denote 
any tenant who underpaid their rent in at least one payment period. However, it is 
important to remember that they may also have not paid and fully paid during their time on 
direct payment.
This chapter focuses on patterns of underpayment amongst the 79 per cent of tenants who 
received seven or more direct payments of HB who underpaid their rent in at least one 
payment period.
3.2 Frequency of underpayment
Analysis of rent account data shows that, most commonly, tenants who received at least 
seven direct payments underpaid just once or twice, although a sizeable proportion 
underpaid more often (see Figure 3.1). There is an inverse relation between the number 
of underpayments made and the number of tenants underpaying. Figure 3.1. shows, for 
24 This analysis was restricted to the 5,031 tenants who had received at least seven direct 
payments of HB because patterns are more difficult to discern over a shorter time 
frame. In addition, by proxy it excludes tenants who were quickly switched back to 
landlord payment because vulnerabilities came to light or they failed to manage and 
who would be unlikely to go onto direct payment under the revised UC criteria. These 
tenants may have skewed the analysis were they in the sample.
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example, that 51 per cent of underpayers (41 per cent of all tenants receiving at least seven 
direct payments) underpaid once or twice while 33 per cent of underpayers (26 per cent of 
all tenants receiving at least seven direct payments) underpaid four times or more.25 This 
suggests that, although most tenants underpaid at some point, only some did so habitually.
Figure 3.1 Number of underpayments made by underpayers 
However, these figures only account for the periods in which tenants underpaid and not 
for the fact that some also failed to pay any rent. Once non-payment is factored into 
underpayers’ rent payment patterns, the frequency with which they failed to make a full 
rent payment increases so that a sizeable proportion failed to pay some or all of their rent 
on a regular basis. Figure 3.2. shows that 40 per cent of underpayers (32 per cent of all 
tenants) underpaid or failed to pay one or twice, while 43 per cent (34 per cent of all tenants) 
underpaid or failed to pay four times or more.
25 Some tenants in the sample only received a total of seven direct payments and so did 
not have the opportunity to underpay more than seven times.
Number of underpayments
Base: All underpayers, 7+ direct payments of HB (3,983).
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Figure 3.2 Number of underpayments and non-payments made by underpayers
3.3 Persistent underpayment
The previous section showed that, although it was most common for tenants to underpay 
once or twice, many did so more often. This could suggest that underpayment is driven by 
long-term, persistent issues. 
However, exploring underpayment patterns in more detail26 shows that tenants were more 
likely to underpay erratically than persistently (i.e. in consecutive periods). Nearly half 
(49 per cent) of all underpayers made no consecutive underpayments and 27 per cent 
(21 per cent of all tenants) underpaid in just two consecutive periods (see Figures 3.3 and 
3.4). Those who underpaid in three or more consecutive periods comprised 24 per cent of 
underpayers (19 per cent of all tenants) and, of these:
• 14 per cent underpaid in three consecutive periods (11 per cent of all tenants);
• five per cent underpaid in four consecutive periods (four per cent of all tenants);
• five per cent underpaid in five or more consecutive periods (four per cent of all tenants).
26 As with the previous sections this analysis uses the sample of tenants who received at 
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Thus, if persistence is determined by having underpaid in at least three consecutive periods 
this applies to nearly one-quarter of underpayers (and 19 per cent of all tenants) suggesting 
that, while persistent underpayment was certainly a feature of tenants’ payment patterns, it 
was not widespread. The prevalence or otherwise of persistent underpayment will be easier 
to confirm once data are available over a longer time frame (18 months of DPDP rent data 
are currently being gathered and analysed). At present some uncertainties remain. These 
are:
• 28 per cent of the persistent underpayers (i.e. of the 19 per cent of tenants who underpaid 
in three or more consecutive periods) underpaid in the last three payment periods for 
which data were available. This raises the possibility that they will continue underpaying, 
thus increasing the small proportion of persistent underpayers who underpay over a longer 
period;
• an additional 303 tenants (six per cent of all tenants) underpaid consecutively in the 
final two payment periods for which data were available. If some of these continued to 
underpay, the proportion of persistent underpayers will increase.








Highest number of consecutive underpayments
Base: All underpayers, 7+ direct payments of HB (3,983).
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Figure 3.4 Highest number of consecutive underpayments; 
proportion of underpayers
Persistent underpayment was particularly common early in a tenant’s direct payment career, 
which could suggest ‘teething’ problems during a ‘settling in’ period. For example:
• nine per cent of all tenants (approximately half of all persistent underpayers) made the first 
of several consecutive underpayments in one of their first three payment periods;
• six per cent of all tenants (approximately one-third of all persistent underpayers) had a run 
of at least three consecutive underpayments starting in the first payment periods.
This mirrors the results from analysis of payment rates across all tenants in the DPDP 
(i.e. including those who received less than seven direct payments)27 which showed a 
significant drop in payment rates in the early stages of the programme. This pattern raises 
the possibility that the prevalence of persistent underpayment early in DPDP tenants’ direct 
payment careers could reflect the infancy of direct payment implementation, rather than 
(or in addition to) inherent problems faced transitioning to a new system. If so, levels of 
persistent underpayment should decrease going forward. Analysis of rent data after 18 
months will shed further light on this.
27 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key findings of the 12 months’ Rent Account 
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3.4 A typology of underpayment
Examining rent payment patterns of tenants who received at least seven direct payments 
in detail reveals three broad types of underpayment28: one-off underpayment; frequent 
underpayment; and infrequent underpayment. Breaking these groups down further to 
capture the extent to which payment is erratic or persistent gives the following typology of 
underpayment:
1 one-off underpayment: only one underpayment made during the period on direct 
payment;
2 frequent, persistent underpayment: at least three underpayments, made consecutively, 
during the period on direct payment;
3 frequent, erratic underpayment: at least three underpayments for tenants who received 
7 to 9 direct payments and at least four underpayments for those who received ten or 
more direct payments, with no more than two underpayments made consecutively;
4 infrequent underpayment: two or fewer underpayments for tenants who received 7 to 9 
direct payments, and three or fewer underpayments for those who received ten or more 
direct payments, with no more than two made consecutively.
It is important to remember that these groups, whose key attributes are highlighted in 
Chapter 5, do not capture all tenants who accrued arrears while on direct payment. Figure 
3.5, which summarises tenants’ payment patterns, shows that some (11 per cent) paid no 
rent in at least one payment period. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 also show that: 
• as noted above, 79 per cent of all tenants underpaid in at least one payment period. Of the 
remainder, ten per cent paid their rent in full and 11 per cent paid no rent in at least one 
period but never underpaid. 
• 39 per cent of tenants underpaid frequently (49 per cent of underpayers), just under half of 
whom underpaid persistently. 
• 60 per cent of all tenants (76 per cent of underpayers) could be characterised as having 
erratic underpayment patterns. This includes:
 – a one-off underpayment (16 per cent of all tenants, or 21 per cent of underpayers);
 – infrequent underpayment (24 per cent of all tenants, or 30 per cent of underpayers);
 – frequent non-persistent underpayment (20 per cent of all tenants or 25 per cent 
of underpayers).
The implications of the relatively high proportion of erratic underpayers are discussed in the 
next section.
28  Like the analysis in the preceding sections, this analysis drew on rent data from the 
sample of 5,031 tenants who had received at least seven direct payment of HB.
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Figure 3.5 Underpayer types
Base: All tenants, 7+ direct payments of HB (5,031).
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Figure 3.6 Underpayer types
3.5 Erratic payment patterns
The prevalence of erratic underpayment raises challenges. If tenants are underpaying, 
whether frequently or infrequently, but in an apparently random fashion, it is difficult to 
accurately forecast who will manage going forward and assess where intervention is 
required. A tenant’s future payment pattern becomes difficult to predict. 
We noted in Chapter 3 that tenants do not fit neatly into a ‘payment’ category. Over a period 
of time a tenant can pay their rent fully, underpay, and not pay any rent. It is as if some 
tenants started anew with each payment period, suggesting that the drivers of their payment 
patterns were shifting and changing. 
Fozia’s payment history illustrates this point well. She is a single parent with a teenage son. 
She explained that when her first direct payment was paid into her bank account she did not 
realise it was her HB. Fozia was adamant about receiving no notification that her HB would 
be paid into her account at that time, although Project Areas did have a process in place for 
doing so. Rather than questioning the additional funds she spent the money:
‘It paid for my son’s birthday. I bought him presents. We had a bit of a party. Not a big 
party. We had a little party and the rest went on bills.’
Base: All underpayers, 7+ direct payments of HB (3,983).
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She was subsequently sent a rent card by her landlord and used this to make her second 
rent payment in full through the Post Office. Fozia’s third direct payment of HB coincided 
with the last few days before her next Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) payment was due, and 
she had no money to put in her gas and electricity meters. She used £20 of her HB for gas 
and electricity with the intention of repaying this as soon as her JSA arrived a few days later. 
Paying a small amount of her rent late would not, she thought, have serious consequences. 
Fozia did not repay the £20 shortfall that month. She explained why:
‘When I got my giro I ended up with more bills than I had the previous month so I 
didn’t end up paying that £20 back. I did eventually pay the £20 back, it wasn’t 
instant, though.’
Just as Fozia moved from non-payment to full payment to underpayment, others moved 
from underpayment to overpayment. For example, of the 90 tenants surveyed who had been 
switched back to landlord payment under one of the two underpayment triggers, 17 per cent 
reported having both overpaid and underpaid. 
A relationship between under and overpayment is no surprise. Tenants who underpay in 
one period may seek to overpay in another to balance their rent account. Others will have 
reached agreement with their landlord for a monthly repayment plan. Had Fozia managed to 
repay the £20 she ‘borrowed’ from her HB she would have been an underpayer one period 
and an overpayer the next. However, the survey results suggest that tenants overpaid for 
a variety of reasons, not just to repay arrears. Table 3.1 shows that, of the 33 telephone 
survey respondents who overpaid their rent29, only four said they did so to pay back arrears. 
Others overpaid by mistake, or to generate some ‘savings’, or as a precaution against future 
arrears.30 
Table 3.1 Why did tenants overpay the rent?
Number
To pay back rent arrears 4
As a precaution – in case I get into rent arrears 7
As a precaution – in case I fall behind on payday loans 3
As a precaution – in case I fall behind on other bills or payments 4
To save up by creating ‘rent-free’ periods (e.g. for Xmas, birthdays, holidays) 5
I overpaid the rent by mistake 8
Other reasons 8
Don’t know 2
Base: tenants who had overpaid rent 33
Note: tenants could give more than one reason.
Source: Telephone Survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
29 As noted earlier, it is important to note that the findings from the telephone survey 
should be seen as indicative, not authoritative, owing to the small sample sizes.
30 Overpayment was not specific to direct payment. Nearly half of those reporting having 
overpaid said they did so before being on direct payment.
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The number of one-off underpayments (and one-off non-payments – see Figure 3.3 in the 
previous section) similarly indicates a degree of unpredictability in tenants’ payment rates 
over time, suggesting that tenants who manage well most of the time can underpay (or not 
pay) unexpectedly one month. One of the reasons for this was a life event, such as illness, 
relationship breakdown, and bereavement. This was certainly the case for Harriet and 
Minnie, amongst other in-depth interviewees.
Minnie, whose story is told in full in at the end of Chapter 4, had paid all her rent on time 
for seven months. In December 2013 her mother had a stroke and her daughter was 
taken critically ill, and over a few months she underpaid her rent by approximately £500. 
Her mother and daughter were both in hospital and subsequently in wheelchairs. Minnie 
explained how she spent her HB during this period:
‘[I spent my HB on] Petrol back and forth to the hospital all day, food and that, you 
know, in places like the canteen but I had to eat, well when I felt like eating. Petrol 
mostly, it was back and forth, back and forth, you know, visiting and then like taking my 
daughter, when she got home then, taking her to appointments back and forth because 
she had that operation.’
Harriet, a single person, also paid her rent in full and on time by Direct Debit (DD) for 
ten months. She was affected by the removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS) but 
successfully applied for a Discretionary Housing Payment (DHP) to cover the shortfall while 
she sought a transfer. She wrongly assumed that adjustments to her payment arrangements 
would automatically be made and were the responsibility of her landlord. She therefore made 
no arrangement for her DHP to be paid to her landlord. During this time, Harriet was taken 
very ill and had to spend some time in hospital. Unable to check her bank account regularly, 
but assuming that any funds in her account were surplus to rent and bill money, she spent 
her DHP leaving her without sufficient funds to cover her rent. 
The amount by which tenants underpaid also fluctuated over time, once again suggesting 
that tenants’ payment behaviour one month may not be a good predictor of their payment 
behaviour going forward. In each underpayment group, underpayment was by a random, 
varying amount. Comparing the highest and lowest underpayment rate (the payment range) 
amongst tenants in each underpayment group demonstrates this point:
• the average range in underpayment rate for infrequent underpayers was 53 percentage 
points (in other words, on average, there was a 50 per cent difference between a tenants’ 
highest and lowest underpayment); only six per cent underpaid by the same amount each 
time they underpaid, and 23 per cent underpaid within a ten percentage point range;
• the average range in underpayment rate for frequent erratic underpayers was 34 
percentage points; only one per cent underpaid by the same amount each time they 
underpaid and only seven per cent underpaid within a ten percentage point range;
• the average range in underpayment rate for frequent persistent underpayers was 
37 percentage points; only two per cent underpaid by the same amount each time they 
underpaid and only 13 per cent underpaid within a ten percentage point range;
• the average range in underpayment rate was 42 percentage points across these three 
underpayment types; only three per cent underpaid by the same amount each time they 
underpaid and only 15 per cent underpaid within a ten percentage point range. 
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In the main, different types of underpayment were not by consistently small or large 
amounts. In other words, no underpayment group was associated with a particular value of 
underpayment. In each underpayment group there were tenants who underpaid by a small 
amount and those who underpaid by a large amount. Amongst persistent underpayers, 
for example, 29 per cent underpaid by less than ten per cent in each of at least three 
consecutive periods, and 25 per cent underpaid by more than 75 per cent in each of at 
least three consecutive periods. The value of individual tenants’ underpayments were not 
generally consistent either, with each tenant underpaying by varying amounts over time. 
Figure 3.7 shows the distribution of all underpayments made by tenants in the four 
underpayment groups. The line indicates the range between the 25th and 75th per centile 
and the square is the average underpayment rate. It shows some variations between the 
different underpayment groups but no marked differences. It shows that:
• one-off underpayers had the highest average underpayment rate: 58 per cent;
• frequent persistent underpayers had the lowest average underpayment rate: 34 per cent;
• average underpayment across the four groups was 41 per cent;
• underpayment rates within each of the four groups varied dramatically;
• however, one-off underpayments and persistent underpayments were made within a 
smaller range than the other underpayment groups.
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of underpayment rates by underpayment group 
The large proportion of tenants underpaying in the demonstration project had raised 
questions within the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) about whether some tenants 
were ‘strategically’ and ‘intentionally’:
• withholding a small amount of rent each month on the basis that this would go unnoticed 
by their landlord or would, at least, not trigger serious action against them but would 
provide additional funds for their household; or
• withholding just enough rent each month to be switched back to landlord payment but not 
enough to accrue arrears that would prove difficult to repay.
These results suggest that few tenants had done so and that ‘strategic’, ‘intentional’ 
underpayment was not commonplace. This issue is explored in more detail in Chapter 5.
Base: All underpayers, 7+ direct payments of HB (3,983).
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3.6 Summary
• There were four main types of underpayment: one-off underpayment; frequent, erratic 
underpayment (i.e. where underpayments were made often but not usually consecutively); 
frequent, persistent underpayment (i.e. where underpayments were made often and 
consecutively); and infrequent underpayment.
• Many tenants who underpaid did so on a regular basis. Nearly half of all underpayers 
could be classed as ‘regular’ underpayers in the sense that they underpaid more than 
three or four times (depending on how long they had been in receipt of direct payment).
• Underpayment is difficult to predict. This is because most underpayment was ‘erratic’ – 
76 per cent of all underpayers fell into this category – in the sense that tenants’ payment 
behaviour one month was not a good predictor of their payment behaviour going forward. 
Payment behaviour fluctuated, with tenants underpaying by different amounts and moving 
between underpayment non-payment and full-payment over time. And there was very 
much a sense that many tenants started anew with each payment period, with it being a 
new challenge and event.
• No underpayment group was associated with a particular amount of underpayment. In 
each underpayment group there were tenants who underpaid by a small amount and those 
who underpaid by a large amount.
• Just under one-quarter of underpayers (19 per cent of all tenants who received seven or 
more direct payments of HB) could be classed as persistent underpayers in the sense that 
they made regular and consecutive underpayment. However, the amount by which tenants 
underpaid varied period on period. 
• Underpayers and non-payers were not distinct groups. Non-payment and full payment 
were features of underpayers’ payment patterns.
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4 The impact of underpayment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the impact of underpayment of rent on landlords and tenants. It 
focuses, in particular, on financial impact in terms of the value of arrears that accrued 
through underpayment and considers the types of underpayment that have the most 
significant impact on the total value of arrears. 
4.2 The financial impact on landlords of 
underpayment
Drawing on the rent account data for all tenants who received direct payments in the 
first 12 months of the Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) (and not just those 
who received at least seven direct payments)31, Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of 
underpayment by value. It presents the proportion of the £1.6m total arrears attributable to 
non-payment, represented by the blue columns, and the proportion attributable to different 
levels of underpayment, represented by the red, green and purple columns.
The figure shows that although non-payers were far fewer in number than underpayers 
(approximately one-quarter of those who accrued arrears – see Figure 2.1) they accounted 
for nearly half the total value of arrears accrued in the first 12 months of the DPDP. 
Nevertheless, because of the relatively high number of tenants underpaying, underpayment 
did account for between 50 per cent (in payment period 2) and 68 per cent (in payment 
period 1) of arrears. 
Figure 4.1 also shows that low value underpayment, i.e. underpayment of 15 per cent or 
less, had a limited impact on the value of arrears in each payment period (although this did 
increase incrementally over the course of the DPDP) despite low-value underpayers being 
the largest underpayment group (see Figure 2.1). The value of the underpayment was, 
therefore, a more significant factor than the number of people underpaying in terms of the 
impact on overall arrears. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the higher the value of underpayment, 
the more significant the impact on the total value of arrears.
31 As this analysis is not looking for patterns over time, the full sample of tenants who 
received direct payment can be used.
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of total underpayment value by proportion of underpayment
Thinking about the typology of underpayment presented in Chapter 3, frequent underpayers 
(persistent and erratic) made a greater contribution to overall arrears than infrequent 
or one off underpayers. And persistent underpayers made the greatest contribution of 
all underpayment groups. Table 4.1 shows that of the £840,000 underpaid by the four 
underpayment groups (one-off, infrequent, frequent erratic, and frequent persistent) nearly 
half was accrued by persistent underpayers, almost double that accrued by frequent erratic 
underpayers and four times that accrued through one-off underpayers.
Period
Base: All underpayers and non-payers in rent payment period (637–4,045).
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Table 4.1 Rent paid by payment type




Full payers 1,974,000 2,004,000 102 -30,000
One-off non-payment 1,355,000 1,325,000 98 30,000
More than one non-payment 910,000 859,000 94 52,000
One-off underpayment 3,655,000 3,555,000 97 99,000
Infrequent underpayment 5,272,000 5,153,000 98 118,000
Frequent erratic underpayment 4,315,000 4,104,000 95 211,000
Persistent underpayment 4,204,000 3,792,000 90 412,000
All 21,684,000 20,792,000 96 892,000
Source: DPDP tenant rent accounts.
Base: All tenants, 7+ direct payments of HB (5,031).
4.3 The impact on tenants of underpayment
Underpayment of rent did not always result in arrears. We reported in Chapter 3 that some 
tenants overpaid their rent to accrue credit on their account, so they could underpay in the 
future without falling into debt. However, underpayment usually did equate to arrears. No 
in-depth interviewees were underpaid without accruing arrears, whether in the short or long 
term, and 52 per cent of telephone survey respondents (or 49 out of 95) were in arrears (or 
still in arrears) at the time of their interview, as the table below illustrates. 
Table 4.2 Are tenants currently up to date with the rent or in arrears? 
Column percentages %
Up to date 48
In arrears 52
Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
In terms of the value of tenants’ arrears, three-quarters of telephone survey respondents 
owed more than £149; 58 per cent owed over £250; and 29 per cent owed more than £500 
(see Table 4.3). Some of these arrears had accrued before the DPDP, but 71 per cent of 
respondents (or 22 tenants) who were in arrears when surveyed, reported not having been 
in arrears prior to direct payment, as Table A.1 illustrates. Of the 14 respondents who were 
in arrears when they went onto direct payment nine reported an increase in their arrears; 
one reported a decrease; and four reported no change in their arrears (see Table A.2). 
This chimes with the wider findings from analysis of the rent accounts of all direct payment 
tenants, which show that the introduction of direct payment represented a step-change in the 
overall account balances of many tenants.32 
32 Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key findings of the 12 months’ Rent Account 
Analysis exercise, DWP Research Report No. 879.
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Table 4.3 By how much were tenants behind with the rent? 
%
Up to £149 25
£150 to £249 17
£250 to £499 29
£500 to £749 17
£750 to £999 6
£1,000 or more 6
Base: tenants in arrears 48
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4. 
There was evidence of high levels of indebtedness amongst tenants in the Project Areas.33 
A baseline survey of 1,639 tenants carried out by the evaluation team prior to the start of the 
DPDP found that 40 per cent of respondents had at least one kind of debt, excluding rent 
arrears, and 44 per cent had rent arrears and/or other debts. As will be explored in more 
depth in Chapter 5, many of the 95 tenants that comprised the telephone survey of Trigger 3 
and 4 underpayers were in debt. 
Arrears resulting from underpayment of rent served to compound tenants’ debts. In addition, 
with already low incomes frequently eroded repaying existing debts, tenants interviewed in-
depth reported struggling to repay the rent arrears they had accrued. This was the case for 
Colin, whose story is told at the end of Chapter 5. After falling into arrears on direct payment, 
he agreed a repayment plan with his landlord but struggled to keep to it. He explained:
‘I’m struggling to pay it [my arrears] back … me social worker set up a payment plan 
just before Christmas but I’ve been struggling to find it, and then they’re trying to get me 
out, or that’s the impression I get, so I’ve had to do without to pay it.’
‘Doing without’, in order to repay arrears was a common theme amongst the underpayers 
interviewed. Pauline described ‘cutting back on gas, I only buy electric now so I don’t have 
the central heating on’ and Fozia explained that she was not left with enough money ‘that I 
can eat every day’. Some tenants were repaying at a relatively high rate; £40 and £50 per 
fortnight or month.
Qualitative interviews and the telephone survey of tenants reveal that tenant underpayment 
had an emotional, as well as a financial impact on some tenants. The majority of tenants 
expressed concern about falling into arrears and were of the view that rent payments, in 
theory at least, were high priority. For example, 89 per cent of survey respondents who had 
switched back under triggers 3 and 4, reported that falling behind with their rent concerned 
them a ‘great deal’ or a ‘fair amount’, as Table 4.4 illustrates.
33 Debt was defined as being behind with a payment, whether for bills, childcare, loan 
repayments, other forms of credit, rent, or arrears repayment arrangements. Someone 
who has taken out a loan but is up to date with the repayments would not be classed as 
being in debt.
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Table 4.4 To what extent does falling behind with the rent concern tenants?
Column percentages %
A great deal 79
A fair amount 10
Not very much 3
Not at all 7
Base: all tenants 95
Excludes one tenant who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4. 
In-depth interviewees expressed feelings of shame, embarrassment and guilt about having 
spent their Housing Benefit (HB) on something other than rent. This was particularly true of 
those who had done so knowingly and willingly (rather than, for example, those who made 
an error and ‘accidentally’ underpaid). Minnie described her feelings in the following terms: 
‘I felt ashamed. I felt like I was robbing somebody, but I spent it and I shouldn’t have 
…. At the time I thought I’d be in trouble, really big trouble. I thought I’d end up losing 
my house. I was embarrassed, I was ashamed, you know? But at the time it was in my 
bank and it was … I needed it.’
Minnie’s story 
Minnie is 45 and has lived in a four bed property for the past 14 years. She lives with her 
son, aged 14, and her mother who has health problems. Her four other children have left 
home. Although Minnie has worked in the past, she is currently unemployed. She suffers 
with depression and spends a lot of time caring for her mum.
Minnie’s rent is £108 per week. In addition to HB, she also receives Income Support (£45), 
Carers’ Allowance (£59), Child Benefit (£20) and Child Tax Credits (£53). Prior to going 
onto direct payment, Minnie had never been in arrears and she reported that paying her 
rent was a priority for her: ‘Yes, I prioritise rent. The rent and council tax.’ She reported 
finding it difficult to get-by and making sacrifices in order to do so: ‘And then I just manage 
on what I’ve got left to pay for anything else. Yes. Whatever I’ve got left depends on what 
we’re having for Sunday dinner. Whether it’s a cheap chicken or a nice bit of lamb. You 
know, we’re just, the weeks I get my Income Support, I tend to be okay and then the 
following week – then it’s no strawberries …. Even with the gas and electric [off], you 
know, being cold, once my mum’s in bed and my son’s in bed, turning off [the gas]. And 
then I’ll get a, you know, I’ve got them in the corner over there, my blankets.’
Minnie went onto direct payment in April 2013, arranging to pay her rent by Direct Debit 
(DD). She was concerned initially that she may be tempted to misspend her HB. ‘Well, 
at first I didn’t see, I thought, “Oh it’s going to be a pain now”, because I’m going to have 
to ring xx [her landlord] because I used to, the day it went in my bank I would ring so it 
would get out my bank because if I’m broke I could think, “Oh hang on, I’ll borrow that”, 
and then, you know, I’d get in a mess.’ However, for the first six months her concerns 
proved unfounded and she paid her rent in full and on time.
Continued
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But in December 2013 a series of events caused her to fall into arrears. First, there was 
a problem with the administration of her HB, which did not arrive in time. Consequently, 
a DD payment was refused due to ‘insufficient funds’ and she was charged £6 by her 
bank. Second, her mother had a stroke and was hospitalised for several weeks. Third, 
Minnie’s daughter had an operation which resulted in an extended stay in hospital.
In December and January Minnie dipped into her HB to pay for trips back and forth to 
the hospital and for other household expenses, and then could not afford to pay the 
rent in full. She underpaid in both months, accruing arrears of around £500: Minnie 
felt ashamed and embarrassed by her actions. She contacted her landlord and they 
arranged for her Housing Benefit to be paid directly to them. They also worked out an 
arrears repayment plan of £30 per month.
Minnie has also been affected by Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS). Since 
October 2013, she has been receiving a Discretionary Housing Payment (DHP) to help 
her cover the RSRS. She said that she received £7 per week in DHP which covered 
approximately half of the RSRS. Her DHP was due to run out in March 2014 and she was 
concerned that this would make it very difficult for her to pay back her arrears. 
4.4 Summary
• Non-payers were far fewer in number than underpayers but they accounted for nearly 
half the total value of arrears accrued in the first 12 months of the DPDP. Nevertheless, 
because of the relatively high number of tenants underpaying, underpayment did account 
for more than 50 per cent of arrears.
• Low-value underpayment (less than 15 per cent of rent owed underpaid) had a limited 
impact on arrears, despite low value underpayers being the largest underpayment group in 
terms of percentage of rent underpaid. 
• Frequent underpayers made a greater contribution to the overall value of arrears than 
infrequent or one-off underpayers. Nearly half of the total value of arrears was accrued by 
persistent underpayers. 
• Arrears arising from underpayment compounded tenants’ debts – 44 per cent had 
existing debts or rent arrears – and put some tenants in arrears whose rent accounts had 
previously balanced. 
• Tenants also reported an emotional impact of underpaying, frequently expressing feelings 
of guilt, shame and embarrassment. 
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5 Understanding underpayment
5.1 Introduction 
Drawing primarily on analysis of rent account data, the previous chapters have profiled 
underpayment, in doing so highlighting types and patterns of underpayment, and its impact 
on landlords and tenants. This chapter seeks to build on this analysis by providing an insight 
into how and why underpayment arises, and in doing so, shedding light on who underpays. 
It does so with specific reference to one underpayer group – those tenants who were 
switched back under the underpayment triggers periods, 3 and 4.34 The analysis draws on 
three data sources: a ‘telephone survey’ of tenants who has switched back under the two 
underpayment trigger periods; in-depth interviews with 20 tenants who had underpaid, most 
of whom took part in this survey, and rent account data. 
Analysis of the data suggests that there are a bundle of factors that contribute to underpayment 
and that the picture is somewhat ‘messy’. This is perfectly illustrated by the response of the 4335 
tenants to the telephone survey who reported that they had underpaid to the question: ‘why did 
you underpay?’. As Table 5.1 illustrates, they gave a myriad of reasons:
Table 5.1 Why did tenants underpay the rent?
No.
I could not (always) afford to pay all of the rent 15
I wanted to be taken off the DP trial 5
I fell behind/to avoid falling behind on pay-day loans 1
I fell behind/to avoid falling behind on other bills or repayments 6
Underpaid by mistake – unsure about how much rent I had to pay 4
Underpaid by mistake – other reasons 11
I was still getting/could not get used to paying the rent myself 4
I was still getting/could not get used to managing my HB money 2
I had problems with my HB claim 6
I had problems with my bank account/direct payments 1
I have/had mental health problems 4
Other reasons 7
Base: tenants who had underpaid rent 43
Note: tenants could give more than one reason.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
34 As noted earlier, a tenant was switched back under the trigger period 3 if they 
underpaid their rent by 15 per cent or more in each of the periods of 4 weeks in the 
preceding 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration Project period. A tenant was 
switched back under trigger period 4 if he/she had under-paid her/his Rent by 15 per 
cent or more in the preceding period of 12 weeks, falling within the Demonstration 
Project period.
35 As noted earlier, the findings from the telephone survey should be seen as indicative 
not authoritative owing to the small sample sizes.
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As is highlighted in Figure 5.1, a number of factors, many of which overlap and are inter-
connected, appear to contribute to underpayment. For most tenants it was not one factor 
that contributed to underpayment, but a bundle. In Colin’s case, whose story is presented 
at the end of this chapter, these were: his financial circumstances (he was finding it very 
hard to make ends meet); problems with his bank account; his health (he is bi-polar); lack of 
support; and his (poor) management skills. These factors, and the other factors contributing 
to underpayment, are explored in the remainder of the chapter. 
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5.2 Characteristics and circumstances of tenants
Analysis of rent account data suggests that underpayment is related to the characteristics of 
tenants. Underpayers appeared to differ to their (non-payer and full payer) counterparts in a 
number of respects. Specifically, as Table 5.2 illustrates, they were more likely to36: 
• be younger – a higher proportion of underpayers fell into the age categories, 16 to 24 and 
25 to 34; 
• be ‘one parent’ and ‘other multi person’ households;
• be living with a partner;
• be in work – 23 per cent of underpayers were compared to 16 and 13 per cent, 
respectively, of non and full payers; and
• live in three bedroomed units.
Conversely, they were less likely to:
• be on full Housing Benefit (HB) – 70 per cent were, compared to 86 and 84 per cent, 
respectively, of non and full payers;
• be in ‘single person’37 households;
• live in one bedroomed units; and
• report that they had ever paid their rent by Direct Debit (DD), with 37 per cent of 
underpayers responding in this way. This compares to 51 per cent of non-payers and 74 
per cent of full payers who did the same.
36 Statistically significant differences, at a 0.05 level, have been highlighted with *. 
Statistical difference testing is used to assess the accuracy of the findings of analysis 
undertaken on sample surveys when the results are an estimate for the population. 
However, it can also be used as a proxy for ‘confidence’ and/or ‘meaningful’ difference 
with administrative data if it does not contain the full population, as is the case here.
37 These are those households with more one than one member who did not define 
themselves as being a ‘couple’ or ‘couple with dependents’. These could include 
households comprising a couple and their adult offspring or a parent and their adult 
children.
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Table 5.2 Comparison of payer types on key characteristics 
Underpayers Non-payers Full payers
Rent account balance relative to rent
More than one period worth of arrears 8 4* 6
Between one period worth of arrears and credit 88 92* 91
More than one period worth of credit 4 4 3
Full or partial Housing Benefit
Full 70 86* 84*
Partial 30 14* 16*
Duration of current HB claim
0 – 1 years 22 24 23
2 – 4 years 30 28 28
5 – 9 years 37 46* 47*
10 years and over 11 2* 2*
Age of lead claimant
16 – 24 6 4* 3*
25 – 34 21 17* 17*
35 – 44 27 25 27
45 – 54 31 32 35
Over 55 15 23* 17
Household composition
Couple 5 6 5
Couple with ‘dependents’ 14 8* 11
Single person 32 50* 54*
Lone parent 33 24* 23*
Other multi 16 11* 7*
Partner present
No 76 83* 82*
Yes 24 17* 18*
Bedrooms
0 or 1 19 32* 40*
2 37 35 33
3 39 27* 23*
4 or more 5 6 4
Claimant hours of work per week
None 77 84* 87*
Less than 16 3 2* 1*
16 – 30 16 10* 10*
30 or more 4 3 1*
Partner hours of work per week
None/no partner 96 97* 97*
Less than 16 0 0 0
16 – 30 2 2 2
30 or more 2 1* 1*
Ever paid by Direct Debit
No 63 49* 26*
Yes 37 51* 74*
Unweighted base 3,983 558 490
* Indicates statistically significant difference compared with underpayers at 0.05 level.
Base: All tenants, 7+ direct payments of Housing Benefit (5,031).
Source: DPDP tenant rent accounts.
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It is important, here, to reflect also on the characteristics of the four underpayment groups 
identified earlier. As Table 5.3 reveals, in most respects, they differed little. However, there 
were some noticeable differences between the groups:
• frequent underpayers, whether erratic or persistent, were much less likely than their 
counterparts to report that they had paid their rent by DD: 31 and 23 per cent respectively 
did, compared to 57 and 51 per cent of one-off and infrequent underpayers who did the 
same;
• one-off underpayers were more likely of the four groups to be on full HB – 83 per cent 
were, compared to 71, 65 and 63 per cent, respectively, of infrequent, frequent (erratic) 
and frequent (persistent) tenants;
• frequent, persistent underpayers were most likely to be on partial HB – 37 per cent were;
• frequent, persistent underpayers were slightly younger than their counterparts;
• of all the four groups, one-off underpayers were least likely to be working –  
only 15 per cent were.
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Table 5.3 Comparison of partial payer types on key characteristics (12 months’ 
Rent Account Analysis)




Rent account balance relative to rent
More than one period worth of arrears 5 6 10 10
Between one period worth of arrears and credit 92 90 88 85
More than one period worth of credit 3 4 3 5
Full or partial Housing Benefit
Full 83 71 65 63
Partial 17 29 35 37
Duration of current HB claim
0 – 1 years 19 23 23 22
2 – 4 years 30 30 32 30
5 – 9 years 36 35 36 40
10 years and over 15 12 9 8
Age of lead claimant
16 – 24 5 6 6 6
25 – 34 18 20 22 26
35 – 44 28 25 29 25
45 – 54 33 32 32 28
Over 55 15 18 11 14
Household composition
Couple 5 7 5 4
Couple with ‘dependents’ 14 13 14 15
Single person 31 33 32 31
Lone parent 35 32 33 32
Other multi 15 15 17 18
Partner present
No 76 76 77 76
Yes 24 24 23 24
Bedrooms
0 or 1 22 19 17 19
2 39 35 39 36
3 34 41 39 39
4 or more 5 5 5 7
Claimant hours of work per week
None 85 79 73 73
Less than 16 1 3 3 3
16 – 30 11 15 20 18
30 or more 3 3 4 5
Partner hours of work per week
None/no partner 97 96 95 94
Less than 16 1 0 0 1
16 – 30 2 2 2 2
30 or more 1 2 3 3
Ever paid by Direct Debit
No 43 49 69 77
Yes 57 51 31 23
Unweighted base 815 1,198 1,012 958
Base: All underpayers, 7+ direct payment of HB (3,983).
Source: DPDP tenant rent accounts.
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5.3 The challenging nature and complexity of 
tenants’ lives
Many participants in the telephone survey and in-depth interviewees led complex and 
precarious lives which made them susceptible (and exposed) to life ‘events’, such as family 
illness or the breakdown of a relationship. This vulnerability encompassed a number of 
aspects: 
• as Table 5.4 illustrates, more than half – 51 per cent – of telephone survey participants 
reported that they had a disability;
• more than three-quarters of telephone survey respondents were not working, as Table 5.4. 
shows;
• many in-depth interviewees had health problems. For example, Colin, whose story is 
presented at the end of this chapter, was bipolar; Ricky suffered from the illness COPD38; 
Angie suffered from depression and had panic attacks; Harry was a recovering alcoholic; 
while Pauline was agoraphobic. And as highlighted in Table 5.1, four tenants (out of 43) 
cited ‘mental health’ problems as being a reason for underpaying their rent;
• as will be explored in the next section, many tenants were experiencing financial hardship;
• tenants often had multiple problems. This was the case for a number of our in-depth 
interviewees, including Colin and Pauline.
38  Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
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Table 5.4 Characteristics and circumstances of telephone survey respondents
Column percentages %
Gender of respondent 
Male 29
Female 71
Age of respondent 
16 to 24 9
25 to 34 30
35 to 44 22
45 to 54 26
55+ 13
Ethnicity of respondent 
White 83




Couple with children 1
Couple 0
Multi-person household 41
Disability status of respondent
No 49
Yes 51
Work status of respondent
Working 24
Not working 76
Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4. 
5.4 Tenants’ financial circumstances 
Perhaps not unexpectedly, many trigger 3 and 4 ‘underpayers’ were struggling to ‘get by’ 
financially, with this appearing to be the biggest contributory factor behind underpayment for 
this group. Data garnered from the telephone survey revealed that: 
• 15 of the 43 respondents who were asked the question, why did you underpay?, cited: ‘I 
could not (always) afford to pay all of the rent’, with this being the most common response 
given by participants, as Table 5.1 reveals;
• 49 per cent of respondents (or 47 out of 95) reported that they found it difficult to pay their 
rent, as Table 5.5 reveals;
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• 54 per cent (or 51 out of 95) reported they were behind with a ‘household bill’, such as 
Council Tax, electricity and gas, as Table A.3 illustrates39;
• 38 per cent (or 36 out of 95) were behind on a ‘loan or repayment’, such as a credit card or 
bank loan, as Table A.4 illustrates40;
• 33 per cent (or 31 out of 95) had automatic deductions from their earnings or benefits to 
pay back any arrears or other debts, as Table A.5 reveals;
• as noted in Chapter 4, many tenants who reported that they were currently in arrears 
also reported that they were in arrears when the DPDP programme started, as Table A.1 
highlights.
Table 5.5 How easy or difficult is it for tenants to afford their rent? 
Column percentages %
Fairly or very easy 40
Neither 12
Fairly or very difficult 49
Base: all tenants 91
Excludes five tenants who did not know how easy or difficult it was to afford the rent.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4. 
Furthermore, when underpayers are considered in their entirety, rent account data found 
that they were more likely to have been in arrears than non-payers and full payers when the 
Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) programme began, as Table 5.1 reveals.
Most in-depth interviewees were struggling to ‘get by’ and had high levels of indebtedness. 
This was certainly the case for Ibrahim, who reported that he was behind on a number of 
bills: 
‘Everything I was behind in the bills. All my bills in the same account and some of them 
the council was taking the rent on the 3rd, electricity, gas all of this comes on the 14th 
so the gap is not very big. So before this one comes the other come. So you are just 
stretching them there.’
And relatively few of them had a financial ‘buffer’ – i.e. savings – which would ‘insulate’ them 
from a financial emergency.
39 Other bills included in this category are: water rates; Other fuel bills like coal or oil; 
telephone bill (including mobiles); childcare bill; Internet bill; Sky/cable TV; and another bill.
40 The other ‘loans or repayments’ falling under this category were: hire purchase 
agreements; Credit Union loans; Money lender loans; payday loans; Social Fund loans; 
Loans from friends or relatives; catalogues paid by instalment; and something else.
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5.5 Poor money management
Another factor appearing to contribute to underpayment is the poor money management 
skills of some tenants. The telephone survey found that:
• nearly a third (31 per cent) of respondents disagreed with the statement: ‘I am very 
organised when it comes to managing my money day-to-day’, as Table A.6 illustrates;
• more than half (54 per cent) disagreed with statement: ‘I am never late at paying my bills’, 
as Table A.7 shows;
• as Table A.8 reveals, only 15 per cent had never ‘run out of money at the end of the week 
or month in the last 12 months’
Many in-depth interviewees appeared to be poor money managers, an attribute which many 
acknowledged. For example, Alison noted that: ‘I am terrible with money. I am terrible’, while 
Eric noted:
‘I’m not too good [at money management] … I’m usually down to my last £2 or £3 by 
the time I get to my JSA’. 
5.6 Tenants’ attitudes to spending and saving
Closely linked to the above factor, another contributor to underpayment appears to be the 
attitude of some tenants to saving and spending:
• nearly a third (31 per cent) of telephone survey respondents agreed with the statement, 
‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them’, as Table A.9 
reveals;
• nearly a third (32 per cent) agreed with the statement, ‘I am more of a spender than a 
saver’, as Table A.10 reveals.
5.7 The prioritisation of other bills over rent?
More than half of respondents to the telephone survey reported that they prioritised the 
payment of their rent over all other bills, as Table 5.6 illustrates. However, crucially, a 
significant proportion – 44 per cent – did not. And, as highlighted in Table 5.1, six (of the 
43 respondents) to the question, why did you underpay your rent?, cited ‘I fell behind to 
avoid falling behind on other bills or repayments’, with one doing the same to avoid falling 
behind on pay-day loan repayments. This behaviour was also evident amongst in-depth 
interviewees, many of whom reported that they prioritised gas and electric bills overpaying 
their rent:
‘I make sure I’ve got plenty of gas and electric and stuff. Yes, I pay that every week.’
(Alison)
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Telephone (Including mobile phone) 1
None of these 1
Base: all tenants 93
Excludes two tenants who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
There were a multitude of reasons why some tenants prioritised the payment of other bills 
over the payment of their rent. However, perhaps surprisingly, given that, as noted earlier, 
most tenants were concerned about being in arrears, the relative security of tenure that 
tenants appeared to feel in terms of their home appears to be a contributory factor. Only 15 
per cent (or seven out) of 46 respondents with arrears believed that their landlord would evict 
them, as Table 5.7 reveals. And a commonly held view amongst in-depth interviewees was 
that they would not be evicted:
‘No, no [I won’t be evicted], I think probably, because I think what’s happened now, 
because the council when you’re owing them rent if they know you’re on benefits they 
don’t put too much pressure on you. But if it’s a private landlord I’m pretty sure they will 
put pressure on you to for eviction at, you know, one month, two months but the council 
they have not been. Before they used to do that but I think it’s costing the council more 
money taking you to court and so on, that’s the reason why.’
Table 5.7 Did tenants think it likely or unlikely that their landlord would evict them 
due to their rent arrears?
Column percentages %
Fairly or very likely 15
Fairly or very unlikely 85
Base: tenants in arrears 46
Excludes two tenants who did not know and one who said it was neither likely nor unlikely.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
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5.8 Confusion about the mechanics of direct 
payment, Housing Benefit, DHP and rent
For some tenants, it appeared that underpayment occurred because they did not understand 
how direct payment ‘worked’. For example, Fozia, whose experiences were explored in 
Chapter 3, reported that she did not realise that the monies paid into her bank account was 
her Housing Benefit payment:
‘And yet I made the mistake by spending it. I just thought I got that much extra but 
I didn’t know where it come from. So yes, I spent it. So no, I’m not on it anymore 
because obviously I did that, but it wasn’t my fault. If I’d have known my money was 
going in there beforehand I wouldn’t have spent it …. In the first month I just noticed I 
had extra money in my account. That was it. So yes, I started using it until I got a letter 
about four weeks after it went into my account telling me that the money’s going into my 
account. That’s when I realised I made the mistake.’
And, as noted in Chapter 3, the principal contributory factor behind Harriet’s underpayment 
was her failure to understand how Discretionary Housing Payment (DHP) worked – she 
erroneously believed that that her landlord would deal with this and adjust her payment 
arrangements, accordingly. 
Confusion about what was ‘HB’ money and ‘her’ money appeared to be a contributory factor 
behind Angie’s underpayment:
‘It [my problem with direct payment] was just knowing what money was mine and what 
money was theirs, cos it was paid into the same account as my dad’s.’
Data from the telephone survey also highlights the difficulties some tenants had in 
understanding direct payment, HB and how much rent they had to pay: four out of 43 
respondents reported that they underpaid by mistake because they were unsure about how 
much rent they had to pay. 
5.9 Problems with the administration of Housing 
Benefit and bank accounts
Another factor which appeared to contribute to underpayment was problems relating to 
the administration of HB payments – six (out of the 43 respondents) to the question, Why 
did you not pay?, cited ‘I had problems with my HB claim’, as Table 5.1 reveals. Another 
respondent cited: ‘I had problems with my bank account/direct payments’ and a number 
of in-depth interviewees reported that they had had problems with their bank and bank 
account, including Colin. Colin, whose story is told at the end of this chapter, reported that 
the principal reason for his underpayment was the actions of his bank, which had ‘taken’ 
his Housing Benefit to pay for an unauthorised overdraft on his current account and made a 
number of charges to his account. 
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5.10 Difficulties adjusting to direct payment
It appears that difficulties adjusting to moving onto direct payment may have contributed to 
some tenants underpaying. As highlighted in Table 5.1, six out of the 43 respondents who 
reported that they had underpaid gave as a reason for underpayment: ‘I was still getting/
could not get used to paying the rent myself’, while two cited: ‘I was still getting/could not get 
used to managing my HB money.’ A number of in-depth interviewees also reported that they 
had encountered difficulties adjusting to direct payment. For example, Eric noted:
‘I think I found it hard at the beginning more than towards the end cos by that time I was 
used to it.’
However, like Eric, a number of in-depth interviewees reported that they did, albeit to 
varying degrees, eventually ‘adjust’ to direct payment. Harry was frustrated that he had been 
switched back to landlord payment as he felt that the experience he had accumulated under 
direct payment meant that he was now much better placed to manage on it. And he was 
frustrated that he did not have the opportunity to ‘prove’ himself: 
‘I would have liked to have continued [on direct payment] because I know now … I 
would have been able to do it.’
5.11 Lack of support 
A factor which appears to have contributed to telephone survey participants underpaying is 
a lack of support to help them manage on direct payment: relatively few – eight per cent (or 
eight tenants) – had received any, as Table 5.8 illustrates. 





Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
There are two dimensions to this apparent support ‘deficit’. For some tenants, like Colin 
and Pauline, it was the lack of support when transitioning onto direct payment that was 
the issue. However, for others such, as Harry, it was the absence of the support when on 
direct payment that appeared to undermine their capacity to manage on it, and therefore 
contributed to their underpayment. 
Whether more support would have resulted in less underpayment is, of course, debatable 
and it is not a panacea for underpayment. However, a couple of in-depth interviewees felt 
that it would have been beneficial for them and made a ‘difference’:
‘If I’d have had a bit of support I would have been okay and I don’t think – well I’m not 
saying I wouldn’t have took that out. I don’t know.’
(Harry)
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‘Oh, yes [support would have helped me manage on DP]. If they [landlord] had that 
support I’d love to go you know, support came after we stopped so.’
(Christopher)
Furthermore, as Table 5.9 illustrates, nearly a third of all respondents to the telephone survey 
felt that receiving support would have allowed them to stay on direct payment. 
Table 5.9 If tenants had been given advice or support, would it have enabled them 






Base: tenants who had not been given advice 87
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
5.12 Succumbing to ‘temptation’ 
A sizeable proportion of tenants in the telephone survey and in-depth interviewees were 
concerned that they would be tempted to ‘misspend’ their HB on other ‘items’ apart from 
their rent. Nearly a quarter of the 73 respondents who were asked the question, ‘Why did 
you want to leave the DP trial?’, cited the reason ‘to avoid the temptation to spend the HB on 
essential items if money is tight’, as Table 5.10 illustrates. And 12 per cent cited: ‘to avoid the 
temptation to spend the HB on non-essentials’. 
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Table 5.10 Why did tenants want to leave the direct payment trial?
Column percentages %
Less hassle if HB is paid to the landlord 41
Didn’t want the responsibility 32
Ensures the rent is paid 27
Easier to budget money if the HB is paid to the landlord 31
I didn’t want to deal with any problems with my HB claim 9
Avoids the temptation to spend the HB on essential items if 
money is tight
24
Avoids the temptation to spend the HB on non-essentials 12
It was too stressful 34
It’s the landlord’s money 13
The landlord prefers it 5
Other reasons 18
Base: tenants who wanted to leave the direct payment trial 73
Note: tenants could give more than one reason.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
In a similar vein, a number of in-depth interviewees, including Angie and Harry, reported that 
they did not want to go onto direct payment because they were concerned that they would 
‘misspend’ their HB:
‘I thought it was absolutely stupid. If you know that money’s there and you don’t get 
paid till next week you’re going to spend it, especially if you’ve got no food in the house. 
I didn’t want it. The first thing I said to my son and daughter about it was “how many 
people are going to think, I don’t get paid till …. I’m going to spend it”. I thought it was a 
stupid way of doing it.’
(Angie)
 
‘They sent me a letter saying they were going to try it out with a few people and what 
would I think about going on to it. And I told them then, because I was just coming off 
the drink, if the money went into my account I would just spend it … Oh no, I told them 
that I was recovering at the time and I told them I was a recovering alcoholic and if the 
money went into my account I would take it out and spend it. I wrote on the form.’
(Harry)
Perhaps not unexpectedly, given that many tenants were struggling to ‘get-by’ and leading very 
precarious lives, a number of in-depth interviewees, including Angie, reported that they had 
succumbed to temptation and ‘misspent’ some of their benefit. However, in practice, most of 
those tenants who had done so had used their HB to pay for, what were commonly described, 
as (financial) ‘emergencies’. For example, Angie reported that she had used some of her HB to 
pay for food and electricity and the cost of her mother’s funeral:
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‘[I used my HB to pay for] food, electric. I did give to my sister some money towards 
the flowers for my mum cos we bought flowers and everything, money towards the 
pedigree [funeral] and towards the food, that was it.’
In a similar vein, Minnie, whose story was presented in Chapter 4, reported that she had 
used some of the money to cover the transport costs of visiting her sick mother in hospital; 
Harry used it to cover the cost of visiting his ill mother in Belfast; while Eric reported that 
some of it had been used to pay for a train fare. 
And more broadly, in most cases where in-depth interviewees had ‘misspent’ their HB, they 
had been used it to pay for necessities and there was little sense of it being used frivolously, 
to pay for ‘luxuries’. As one member noted: 
‘Like I said, not intentionally [did I underpay]. But I know that if I didn’t have no gas or 
electric for example one night he didn’t have food. There is no way I would let him [be 
without] food. In that instant, yes. I might be tempted to use a little bit of it. But like I 
said I’m not going out and partying on the money or anything else. If I was doing that 
then yes, I know I’d be out of order. But it’s not. It’s been for like bills and stuff that I’ve 
had.’
(Fozia)
Interestingly, most tenants who reported that they had been tempted and ‘misspent’ some 
of their HB were frustrated that this had happened and were annoyed with themselves – 
relatively few sought to blame their landlord (or the Government): 
‘I was annoyed because of what I’d done and when I sat and thought about it I 
shouldn’t have done that. But it got beyond my control. I was annoyed about it. That’s 
what I told them whenever I came back that it was wrong, and to pay it back.’
(Harry)
5.13 A ‘strategic’ and ‘intentional’ attempt to be 
removed from the DPDP programme? 
When the DPDP programme was conceived there was a concern that some tenants would 
underpay (or not pay) their rent as part of a conscious and deliberate strategy to be taken 
off direct payment and/or to secure, what one Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
stakeholder described, as an ‘interest free loan’. We found no evidence to support the latter 
assertion but some to support the former. 
Before exploring this evidence, it is important to make three contextual points. First, the 
preference for landlord payment was the norm for most (trigger 3 and 4) ‘underpayers’ – 
most participants in the telephone survey reported that they wanted to leave the programme, 
as Table 5.11 illustrates. 
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Table 5.11 Did tenants want to remain on or leave the direct payment trial?
Column percentages %
Wanted to stay 5
Wanted to leave 77
Did not mind either way 18
Don’t know 1
Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
And in-depth interviewees were of like mind and reported that they would prefer not to be 
on the DPDP programme and did not want to go onto it. For example, as highlighted in the 
previous section, both Angie and Harry did not want to go onto the programme because they 
thought they would be ‘tempted’ (for a variety of reasons) to spend their HB.
Second, as for most tenants’ underpayment appears to be a result of a number of factors, 
it is very difficult to get a handle on the relative salience and importance of individual 
contributory factors, such as ‘strategic, intentional’ underpayment.
Third, defining intentional is problematic. For example, a number of tenants including Eric, 
Minnie, Angie, and Fozia, whose experiences were explored in Chapter 3, reported that 
they underpaid because they were merely ‘borrowing’ money from their landlord with the 
intention of paying it back immediately. How should these tenants be treated? Are these 
tenants intentional underpayers? Clearly, this is a fuzzy area and one could make convincing 
arguments for and against their inclusion in this category. 
‘It’s getting better now, it was difficult cos if I knew that money was there I’d spend it 
and think “I’ll put that back Thursday” but I never did …. Whenever that money went 
in it always seemed to be the week before I got paid then I think “I get paid a week on 
Thursday I’ll put it back in cos the rent doesn’t go out till Friday” but I forget to put it 
back in and then they try to take their amount out and that amount wasn’t in there and I 
think to myself “I forgot to put it back in”.’
(Angie)
And there were a number of in-depth interviewees who reported that they intentionally drew 
on their HB, even though their intent was not in any way strategic and not motivated by 
a desire to revert to landlord payment. For these tenants, their Housing Benefit and rent 
account appeared to act as a surrogate bank account, which, as well as acting as a savings 
account (see Section 3.5 and Table 3.3), could be used to pay for financial emergencies.
‘Yes, I got myself into a mess. I borrow from it [HB] cos with only having a basic amount 
of money you have to keep lending one to pay another. I missed my TV payment and 
got myself in a complete mess with my TV licence and I could not afford a fine for the 
TV licence, that’s all I’ve got is a TV. So I borrowed to pay that and then I borrowed to 
pay a bit of the water rates, then I tried to pay back a bit more and it ended up a mess.’
(Pauline)
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However, notwithstanding these caveats, for a small number of tenants, it appears that their 
desire to leave the DPDP programme was a contributory factor behind their underpayment 
– as Table 5.1 illustrates, it was one of the reasons given for underpayment, being cited by 
five out of 43 respondents. But for most tenants it appears that the desire to be taken off 
direct payment was not a contributory factor behind their underpayment, an assertion which 
is supported by rent account data and data from both the telephone survey and in-depth 
interviews with underpayers):
• rent account analysis presented in Chapter 3 revealed that most underpayment was not 
persistent (one might expect strategic, underpayment to fall into this category);
• the only evidence to support the notion of ‘strategic’, ‘intentional’ underpayment in the in-
depth interviews can be found in the one conducted with Alison. She was very unhappy 
about being put onto direct payment and noted at the start of her interview that:
‘I told them I didn’t want to do it. I told them straight. But they still done it …. I spoke to them 
on the phone that I don’t really want to do it. [They said]: “like well you have to do it”.’
 She then noted towards the end of her interview when explaining why she underpaid that:
‘No. I did tell them straight from the start I didn’t want to do it though. But they wouldn’t 
listen so I thought b***er it.’ 
 However, Alison’s story highlights the difficulty of unpicking intention and, indeed, 
highlighting attribution in terms of underpayment – she used her HB to pay for necessities: 
food for her son and herself:
‘It was for me and my son, food and stuff.’;
• linked to this point, for most tenants underpayment was not a choice and a number of in-
depth interviewees reported that they had no option but to underpay. For example, Harry 
noted: 
‘I was annoyed because of what I’d done and when I sat and thought about it I 
shouldn’t have done that. But it got beyond my control.’ 
 In a similar vein, Fozia noted:
‘Like I said if I haven’t got money for food and that there’s no way I can get money from 
anywhere else.’;
• most tenants reported that they did not realise that they would be taken off direct payment 
if they underpaid or did not pay their rent. As Table 5.12 reveals, only 12 of the 48 
respondents who were asked whether they were aware that if they missed rent payments 
or paid only part of the rent they would be take off the direct payment trial, replied in the 
affirmative;
• as highlighted in the previous chapter, there were many negative consequences for 
tenants associated with underpayment, including (additional) financial hardship brought 
about by paying back arrears and the ‘shame’ of failing under direct payment.
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Table 5.12 Were tenants who missed rent payments or paid only part of the rent 
aware that they would be take off the direct payment trial if they did so?
Aware? Number of tenants
Yes, did know 12
No, did not know 35
Don’t know 1
Base: 48
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
5.14 ‘Accidental’ underpayment 
Strategic, intentional underpayment did not then appear to be a major contributory factor 
behind the underpayment of most (trigger period 3 and 4) tenants. However, underpaying 
by ‘accident’ did – as Table 5.1. reveals, 15 of the 43 telephone survey participants who 
were asked the question about why they had underpaid, reported that they had done so by 
‘mistake’. These included a number of in-depth interviewees including Ibrahim who reported 
that this his problems with direct payment began when he erroneously paid his rent twice: 
‘On the 3rd of the month so the second month I was just playing with my computer. 
I put £485 for the month rent and then I press again. I saw it wasn’t showing on the 
system that the rent is gone. The first payment not Direct Debit just pay …. Yes, so I did 
it twice …. Two lots out at the same time which then come letter to me from the bank. 
I exceed my overdraft limit what they charge me for …. That’s the point, that the whole 
problem started from. So I start paying that way. No, what he said was “don’t pay us 
next month because you paid for the two months in advance”. I went to the bank – I ask 
I want to keep my date. At the same time I’ve got this problem. They said put the same 
date, just £1. So the council so the account continues. Which put until now the £1 is 
there. So I put £1 for a month and then when they pay me again I went out of the limit 
again. So that’s where the problem starts from.’
5.15 ‘Triggers’
Underpayment was often triggered by a specific trigger(s). Some of these related to day-
to-day activities such as the need to pay an outstanding gas or electric bill or ‘running’ out 
of food. However, for some in-depth interviewees, like Angie, Minnie, Harry and Harriet, the 
trigger that ‘pushed’ them into underpayment was a life event, such as breaking-up with 
a partner, family illness or bereavement. These triggers impacted on them in two ways – 
emotionally, making it more difficult to manage their lives, including direct payment; and 
financially, by putting a strain on their budgets. Given that many of the tenants surveyed 
appeared to lead very precarious and challenging lives, which involved them living life on a 
day-to-day to basis and without financial buffers to cope with life ‘shocks’, the susceptibility 
of tenants to triggers is perhaps not unexpected. 
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Thinking, then, about how tenants came to underpay, and specifically the intent behind it, it 
appears that they can be categorised into three groups: 
• strategic, intentional underpayers, which, as noted above, is a relatively small group;
• accidental underpayers, which is a relatively large group, including Colin and Ibrahim;
• ‘trigger’ prompted underpayers. Members of this group were aware that they were 
underpaying, so in that sense their underpayment was intentional. However, and 
crucially, they did not do so as part of a strategic and conscious plan to leave the DPDP 
programme. Instead, their underpayment was prompted by a ‘trigger’, which gave them 
no option but to ‘dip’ into their HB monies, or made it inevitable that they would underpay. 
This is the largest of the three groups, with its members including Minnie and Angie.
Colin’s story
Colin is 48, single, and has spent the past four years living in a one-bed flat. As he has 
bipolar disorder, he is unable to work and receives out-of-work welfare benefits and HB. 
Prior to going onto direct payment, Colin reported that he had never been in arrears and 
had very little contact with his landlord. 
When he was first contacted about going onto direct payment at the beginning of the 
DPDP programme, he informed his landlord that he did not want to do so: 
‘They wrote me a letter. They mithered me for months cos I didn’t want to go onto it.  
It would probably be over two years ago when they first started mithering me. … 
They kept writing to me asking for my bank details and I wouldn’t give them [to] them 
cos I didn’t want to go onto it. In the end they said if I didn’t give them my bank details 
they’d stop me money, stop paying me Housing Benefit.’
Colin reported that he had received no advice and support from his landlord prior to 
going onto direct payment, although he did note that they had encouraged him to set 
up a DD, advice which he refused because he was concerned that it would result in him 
incurring bank charges. 
In March 2013, Colin moved onto direct payment. He underpaid his rent in the first 
two months of being on the programme and paid no rent in the third month. This 
resulted in him accruing rent arrears of about £600. He was then switched back to 
landlord payment. In terms of why Colin underpaid, he largely attributed this to his 
Housing Benefit being ‘taken’ by his bank to pay for an unauthorised overdraft on his 
current account and bank charges: ‘The vast majority of it went on bank charges and 
things like that. You’ve only got to miss one Direct Debit and you get a £30 payment 
of unauthorised overdraft charges, then you get something else comes out and takes 
up that £30 and that won’t go out and so that’s another £30, it soon adds up.’ Colin 
reported that he had not ‘strategically’ and ‘intentionally’ underpaid his rent. Instead, his 
underpayment was a result of his inability to ring-fence his rent and he felt that he had 
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Repaying his arrears was proving difficult for Colin. His social worker helped him to set 
up a repayment plan (£20 per fortnight). He had so far paid off about £200 of the arrears, 
but was now struggling to meet the payment every week. Colin’s perception was that his 
landlord had been unsupportive and now wanted to evict him: 
‘All I get off them [my landlord] is xxx [expletive] letters, basically … [the contact from 
my landlord] is not to help me, more to give me grief. I’ve got one bloke, this is why 
my social worker dealt with it, he rung me and really spoke down to me like a naughty 
child, so I went through a stage where I wouldn’t answer the phone to them.’
5.16 Summary 
Analysis of data garnered from a telephone survey and in depth interviews with one key 
underpayer sub-group – tenants who switched back under trigger periods 3 and 4 – and 
rent account analysis, provides an insight into how and why underpayment occurs and who 
underpays. It appears that several factors contributed to underpayment. These include: 
• the characteristics and circumstances of tenants. Rent account analysis (RAA) 
revealed that (compared to non-payers and full payers) underpayers were more likely to be 
younger and be in work. Conversely, they were less likely to pay their rent by DD and be 
on full HB. In terms of the characteristics of the four underpayer types, in most respects, 
they differed very little. However, frequent underpayers, whether erratic or persistent, were 
much less likely than their counterparts to pay their rent by DD;
• the challenging nature and complexity of tenants’ lives. Many participants in the 
telephone survey and in-depth interviewees led complex and precarious lives which made 
them susceptible (and exposed) to life ‘events’ such as family illness or the breakdown of a 
relationship;
• tenants’ financial circumstances. Perhaps not unexpectedly, many trigger period 3 
and 4 ‘underpayers’ struggled to get by financially, with this appearing to be the biggest 
contributory factor behind their underpayment;
• poor money management. Trigger period 3 and 4 underpayers appeared to have 
relatively poor money management skills, which appeared to undermine their ability to 
manage on direct payment and pay their rent;
• tenants’ attitudes to spending and saving. Nearly a third of telephone survey 
respondents agreed with the statements: ‘I am impulsive and tend to buy things even 
when I can’t really afford them’ and ‘I am more of a spender than a saver’;
• the prioritisation of other bills over rent. A significant proportion – 44 per cent – of 
respondents to the telephone survey reported that they did not prioritise the payment of 
their rent;
• confusion about direct payment, HB monies and rent. For some tenants, 
underpayment occurred because they did not appear to understand how direct payment, 
HB and/or their rent ‘worked’;
• problems with the administration of HB and bank accounts, which appeared to be an 
issue for a number of in-depth interviewees;
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• difficulties adjusting to direct payment. The inability of some tenants to adjust to direct 
payment appears to have contributed to their underpayment;
• lack of support. Another factor which appears to have contributed to telephone survey 
participants underpaying is a lack of support to help them manage on direct payment: 
relatively few – eight per cent (or eight tenants) – had received any;
• the temptation to spend HB. A significant proportion of tenants in the telephone survey 
and in-depth interviewees were concerned that they would be tempted to ‘misspend’ their 
HB. Some did. However, in practice, most of those tenants who did so reported that they 
used their HB to pay for necessities and financial emergencies, and not frivolously, on 
‘luxuries’;
• a ‘strategic’ and ‘intentional’ attempt to be removed from the direct payment 
programme? When the DPDP programme was conceived there was a concern that 
some tenants would underpay (or not pay) their rent as part of a conscious and deliberate 
strategy to be taken off direct payment and/or to secure, what one DWP stakeholder 
described, as an ‘interest free loan’. We found no evidence to support the latter assertion 
but some to support the former: for a small number of tenants, it appears that their desire 
to leave the DPDP programme was a contributory factor behind their underpayment, with 
their underpayment (in part) being strategic and intentional;
• ‘accidental’ underpayment: 15 of out of the 43 telephone survey respondents who were 
asked the question about why they underpaid, reported that they had done so by ‘mistake’;
• ‘triggers’. Although there were a number of underlying factors which appeared to 
contribute to underpayment, it was often triggered by a specific trigger(s). These fell into 
two categories: day-to-day triggers, such as the need to pay an outstanding gas or electric 
bill or ‘running’ out of food; and life events, such as breaking-up with a partner, family 
illness or bereavement.
In terms of intent, then, it appears that underpayers can be categorised into the three groups: 
strategic, intentional underpayers; accidental underpayers; and trigger prompted 
underpayers.
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6 Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This short chapter is concerned with highlighting the key learning to emerge from this 
study of underpayment, particularly with the roll-out of Universal Credit (UC) in mind, and 
highlighting future research outputs. 
6.2 Key learning 
• Underpayment was a major problem in the Direct Payment Demonstration Project (DPDP) 
programme. More than three-quarters of all tenants underpaid (i.e. paid some but not all 
of their rent) while on direct payment, with underpayment accounting for more than half 
of the total value of arrears accrued in the first 12 months of the programme. Persistent 
underpayment accounted for nearly half of all arrears accrued by underpayers during  
the DPDP.
• With the roll out of UC in mind, it is an issue that the Department for Work and Pensions 
(DWP), landlords and other stakeholders should pay particular attention to. However, it is 
not an issue that is easily ‘solved’. This is because, in a number of respects, it is a messy 
and complex problem.
• First, it is complex in terms of the patterns of underpayment, with underpayers falling into 
four groups: one-off underpayers; frequent, erratic underpayers (i.e. whose underpayments 
are made often, but not usually consecutively); frequent, persistent underpayers (i.e. 
whose underpayments are made often and consecutively); and infrequent underpayers.
• Second, underpayment (or, payment patterns generally) is difficult to predict. This is 
because most underpayment is ‘erratic’ in the sense that tenants’ payment behaviour 
one month was not a good predictor of their payment behaviour going forward. Payment 
behaviour fluctuated, with tenants underpaying by different amounts and moving between 
underpayment, non-payment and full payment over time. And there was very much a 
sense that many tenants started anew with each payment period, with it being a new 
challenge and event.
• Third, it is complex in terms of how tenants come to underpay with there being a bundle 
of interlinked factors that appear to be behind it. Notwithstanding this, the most important 
contributory factor appears to be the financial circumstances of tenants, many of whom 
reported that they were finding it very difficult to ‘get by’.
• Fourth, underpayment was often triggered by a particular life event, such as breaking-up with 
a partner, family illness or bereavement. Predicting such events is impossible. Many of the 
underpayers that comprised the telephone survey and in-depth interviewees led complex 
and challenging lives which made them susceptible (and exposed) to such events.
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• One of the rationales behind the decision to undertake bespoke research on 
underpayment was the notion that persistent underpayment was an issue in the DPDP 
programme. It was – just under one-quarter of underpayers (19 per cent of all tenants 
who received seven or more direct payments of Housing Benefit (HB)) could be 
classed as persistent underpayers in the sense that they made regular and consecutive 
underpayments.
• Underpayers and non-payers are not distinct groups. Non-payment is a feature of 
underpayers’ payment patterns, just as full payment can also be a feature of the payment 
patterns of tenants who underpay and/or fail to pay at some point.
• Although not a panacea for the problem of underpayment, it appears that providing more 
support to tenants, particularly at the start of direct payment, may have a positive impact 
on payment patterns. 
• It appears that are no ‘winners’ in terms of underpayment. As noted in Chapter 4, it had 
an adverse impact on landlords’ arrears. But it also adversely affected tenants, many of 
whom were finding it difficult to pay back the rent they owed and were ‘embarrassed’ and 
‘ashamed’ about the situation they found themselves in. And there was little evidence to 
suggest that tenants had ‘beaten’ the system. However, it appears that a small number 
had underpaid their rent as part of a strategic, intentional attempt to revert to landlord 
payment. 
• Thinking more broadly about the classification of tenants in terms of intent to underpay, in 
addition to strategic, underpayers, they fell into two other groups: 
 – trigger prompted underpayers. Members of this group were aware that they were 
underpaying, so in that sense their underpayment was intentional. However, and 
crucially, they did not do so as part of a strategic and conscious plan to leave the DPDP 
programme. Instead, their underpayment was prompted by a ‘trigger’, which gave 
them no option but to ‘dip’ into their HB monies, or made it inevitable that they would 
underpay;
 – accidental underpayers, who appeared to underpay their rent unintentionally, by 
‘mistake’.
6.3 Other outputs from the evaluation
Three reports have been published alongside this report: 
• a report highlighting the key issues to emerge from the 12 months’ RAA exercise: 
This report analyses rent account data generated for the first 12 months of the DPDP 
programme being ‘live’. See Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Key findings of the 
12 months’ Rent Account Analysis exercise, DWP Research Report No. 879;
• an extended learning report which highlights the key learning to emerge from the first 12 
months of the programme being ‘live’, i.e. from June 2012 to June 2013. It draws on both 
quantitative and qualitative data to do so. See Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: 
12 months in extended learning report, DWP Research Report No. 876;
• a short report highlighting the key findings of the second stage tenant survey. See 
Direct Payment Demonstration Projects: Report from the stage 2 survey of tenants, DWP 
Research Report No. 878.
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Later in the year, the following reports will be published:
• a report highlighting the key issues to emerge from the 18 months’ RAA exercise. 
This will analyse data for the programme for its entire duration and will seek to identify 
any impact of welfare reforms, such as Removal of the Spare Room Subsidy (RSRS), on 
payment and arrears levels in the DPDP programme;
• a report highlighting the key findings of the third stage tenant survey. In doing so, 
data gleaned from this survey will be compared with that derived from the ‘Baseline’ and 
Second Stage surveys; and
• an overarching final report. This will pull together all the analysis undertaken by the 
study team to highlight the evaluation’s key findings.
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Appendix 
Additional tables from the 
telephone survey of trigger  
3 and 4 switchback tenants
Table A.1 Were tenants in rent arrears before they went onto the 
direct payment trial? 
Column percentages %
Yes – in arrears 29
No – not in arrears 71
Base: tenants in arrears 47
Excludes one tenant who did not know and 1 who could not remember.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.2 Have the arrears of tenants who were behind with the rent before they 




Remained the same 4
Base: tenants who were in arrears before the direct payment trial 14
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
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Other fuel bills like coal or oil 0





None of these 46
Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.4 On what loans and repayments are tenants behind?
Column percentages %
Credit or store cards 13
Hire purchase agreements 2
Bank or finance company loans 7
Credit Union loans 1
Money lender loans 16
Payday loans 1
Social Fund loans 14
Loans from friends or relatives 5
Catalogues paid by installment 10
Something else 6
None of these 62
Base: all tenants 9
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
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Table A.5 Do tenants have automatic deductions from their earnings or benefits to 
pay back any arrears or other debts?
Column percentages %
Yes – one 21
Yes – two 11
No 66
Don’t know 2
Base: all tenants 95
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.6 To what extent do tenants agree or disagree with the statement that ‘I am 
very organised when it comes to managing my money day to day’?
Column percentages %
Strongly agree or tend to agree 50
Neither 19
Strongly agree or tend to disagree 31
Base: all tenants 93
Excludes two tenants who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.7 To what extent do tenants agree or disagree with the statement that ‘I am 
never late at paying my bills’?
Column percentages %
Strongly agree or tend to agree 41
Neither 6
Strongly agree or tend to disagree 54
Base: all tenants 94
Excludes one tenant who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
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Table A.8 How often, if at all, did tenants run out of money at the end of the week or 






Base: all tenants 94
Excludes one tenant who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.9 To what extent do tenants agree or disagree with the statement that ‘I am 
impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them’?
Column percentages %
Strongly agree or tend to agree 31
Neither 7
Strongly agree or tend to disagree 62
Base: all tenants 94
Excludes one tenant who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
Table A.10 To what extent do tenants agree or disagree with the statement that ‘I am 
more of a saver than a spender’?
Column percentages %
Strongly agree or tend to agree 32
Neither 13
Strongly agree or tend to disagree 55
Base: all tenants 92
Excludes three tenants who did not know.
Source: Telephone survey of tenants switched back under triggers 3 and 4.
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